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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the language of the Purchase Agreement 
(Addendum Exhibit "E") between Marveon and Young Electric 
Sign Company was not sufficient t :> i: equ ire the (defendant Young 
Electric Sign Company to indemnify Marveon for Its own 
negligence. 
Whether indemnification is not the proper of measure 
of damages for breach of contract. 
Whether Young Electric Sign Company did not have a 
duty to provide insurance to Marveon under the terms of the 
Purchase Agreement (Addendum Exh Ifai t "E"). 
REFERENCE TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals upon which 
this Petition lor Writ of Certiorari is premised maj be 
found at Pickhover v. Smithfs Management Corp., 106 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 43 (April 11, 19 8 9 Amended Opinion). 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
The date of the decision for which Young Electric 
Sign Company requests this Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
April . 1989. 
On May 11, 1989, the appellant Young Electric Sign 
Company requested an Ex Parte Order for Extension of Time to 
File Petition for Certiorari, which was signed by the Honorable 
Justice Richard G. Howe on May 11, 1989, within the 
prescribed period of time for such an order. That order 
granted the appellant, Young Electric Sign Company, to and 
including June 12, 1989, to file its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the above-entitled 
action is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1988) and pursuant to Rule 42, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There appear to be no provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, Utah Code Annotated, or other regulations that 
are determinative of the issues in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition. 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari comes as a 
result of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
affirming the decision of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Judge Scott Daniels presiding, which granted a Motion for 
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Partial Summary Judgment to Marveon, Inc. , (hereinafter 
referred to as "Marveon11) against the defendant and appellant, 
Young E] eotri c S icfin Company (here ina fte:i: referred to as 
"YESCO11 ') Pickhover v. Smith's Mana g erne n t Corp.. , 10 6 Utah 
Adv. Rpt ~ (April ] ]
 i 1989 Amended Opinion ) The appeal 
to this Court, wh ich was initial] y referred to the Court of 
survivors of Johi i, W, Pickhover, Oi 1 January 5, 198 5, a s:i gn 
fell off the si de of a Smith*s Food King located at 
approxi mately 9 4 00 Soi ith 2 3 00 Ea s t :ii i i Sandy, Utah The s :i  :p I 
Subsequent to that, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit naming YESCO 
and Marveon, among others, as defendants, Marveon filed its 
: f a Pi irehase Agreement between Marveon and YESCO1 whereby 
Marveon argued that YESCO was required to indemnify Marveon I; .o 
the fu] ] extent of any judgment :i i I the action i lp to 
$ ] 0 0 0 0 0 0 Tl i = t r :i a ] • ::::«:: i u : I: g :i ram: I t = .• I I Ian < reoi i s 1 lo !:::i :: i i f :: i : 
Summary Judgment on October 31, 3 98 6, and certified the summary 
judgment as a final order pursuant to Rul e 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, oi I January 2 1987. The appeal process 
then ensued. 
Oral argument was held before the Utah Court of 
Appeals on Tuesday, November 29, 1988. Oi i February 10, 1989, 
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the Court of Appeals filed its Opinion. Pickhover v, 
Smith's Management Corp., 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. (February 10, 
1989) . Subsequently, the respondent, Marveon, filed a Petition 
for Rehearing on February 22, 1989. The hearing on that 
request for rehearing was held on April 4, 1989, and an Amended 
Opinion was entered along with an Order on Rehearing on 
April 11, 1989. The Order vacated the prior Opinion and 
substituted the Amended Opinion which affirmed the decision of 
the trial court. On May 11, 1989, the appellate YESCO filed 
its Ex Parte Request for Order for Extension of Time, which was 
assigned by the Honorable Justice Richard G. Howe on May 11, 
1989. This Petition is now offered for review by the Court. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. John W. Pickhover was killed on January 5, 
1985, when a sign fell off a Smith's Food King store located 
at approximately 9400 South 2300 East, Sandy, Utah. (R. at 5.) 
2. The sign had been installed by the defendant 
Marveon Sign Company in August of 1978. (R. at 4.) 
3. In August of 1981, Young Electric Sign 
Company negotiated for and bought the assets of Marveon. Among 
the assets purchased by Marveon were certain maintenance 
contracts, including a maintenance contract for Smith's Food 
King store located at Sandy, Utah. (R. at 328.) 
-4-
4 The Purchase Agreement embodying the 
agreement between YESCO and Marveon was signed on August; 2 8, 
1981. (R. at 335 ) 
5 II: I = I i in ::l:iase Agn eemei l t: between 
YESCO, attached as Exhibit "E," provi des that YESCO obtain 
"insurance coverage adequate to full y protect [Marveon] against 
persona] :1 nji in y or dc= .ath claims ari si ng out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use
 i ser ' ' i ze ., transpor tatioi l. • :::)r 
installation of displays i n a minimum amount of one nil 11 ion 
dollars ($1,000,00.00) (Purchase Agreement, Section 2,a at 
af ter the purchase of Marveon by YESCO1, on Januar y 5, 19 8 5", the 
sign fell off the building and ki lied John Pickhover 
6 1 ! f ter the lawsuit ensued, the defendant 
:I = .fendant Young Electric Si gn Company apparently based upon i ts 
cross-claim, aga :i nst a] 1 defendants (Adidendum Exhibit "F" pp. 4 
S 5) an: I I based i IP :::)ii: l . « . ••"*". 
. November ..• : - . .^. „ entered 
its Order and Judgmenv .! Marvec: *H Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Addendum E>:h
 ;;: • r. 
8 . Th> ; 
affirming the decision u: -.;;e t;r .i., court 
(i addendum Exhibit "A.") 
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ARGUMENT 
YESCO respectfully asserts that this Court should 
grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the 
decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with prior 
decisions of this Court. Also, the questions presented here 
for review are important enough that they should be settled by 
this Court; further, the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision which has sanctioned the departure by the trial court 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and 
consequently requires this Court to exercise its power of 
supervision. 
First, the language of the Purchase Agreement between 
Marveon and YESCO was not sufficient to require the defendant 
Young Electric Sign Company to indemnify Marveon for its own 
negligence. This Court has consistently applied a strict 
construction rule with respect to indemnification agreements as 
has the Federal District Court for the District of Utah. 
Second, indemnification is not the proper measure of 
damages for a breach of contract. The decision of the 
appellate court is internally inconsistent in that it provides 
that an agreement to purchase insurance does not make the party 
agreeing to provide the insurance an indemnitor. In fact, the 
Court of Appeals was at great pains to point out in its Amended 
Opinion that YESCO was liable for breach of contract for its 
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failure to purchase insurance on behalf of Marveon; yet, it 
affirms the decision of the trial court granting Marveon's 
Motion for Summary Judgment which specifically states that 
Marveon is entitled to indemnification to the extent of any 
judgment entered against Marveon. This is simply not the 
proper measure of damages. 
Finally, the appellant, YESC0, did not have a duty to 
provide insurance to Marveon under the terms of the Purchase 
Agreement. YESC0 has argued from the beginning that its 
promise to provide insurance was premised upon certain other 
promises made by Marveon in the Purchase Agreement. 
Specifically, Marveon promised that it had performed all of its 
obligations required under contracts purchased and assumed by 
YESCO. YESCO argued before the Court of Appeals and before the 
trial court that the Motion for Summary Judgment was premature 
in that there were issues of fact to be determined by the jury 
as to whether or not Marveon breached any of its contractual 
obligations to Smith's prior to the sale of Marveon's assets to 
YESCO. YESCO asserted that if Marveon did breach its 
obligations to Smith's, then YESCO would not be obligated to 
purchase insurance for the benefit of Marveon. Interestingly 
enough, the jury answered in the affirmative the question of 
whether or not Marveon breached its agreements under its 
-7-
maintenance contract with Smith's; the same maintenance 
contract that YESCO purchased. 
POINT I 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
MARVEON AND YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY TO INDEMNIFY MARVEON FOR ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE 
The issue of whether or not an agreement to purchase 
insurance is an indemnification agreement and the issue of 
how those agreements should be construed are currently before 
the Utah Supreme Court. The decision of Judge Winder is 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272 (D. Utah 
1985), has been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit and apparently certified to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah for an advisory opinion as to the 
interpretation of indemnification agreements and agreements to 
purchase insurance, which under Freund were construed as 
agreements to indemnify and thus strictly construed. It is 
obvious that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not 
believe that this issue has been resolved adequately by the 
Utah couirts and accordingly it would be appropriate if this 
decision of the Court of Appeals likewise be determined by this 
Court. 
The language of Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthed 18 
Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848 (1966) and Union Pacific R.R. Co. v 
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El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965) 
in conjunction with the language in Freund, supra, 
demonstrates that agreements to insure are essentially 
agreements to indemnify and should thus be strictly construed. 
This Court has applied a strict interpretation standard when 
interpreting indemnity provisions similar to the one at hand. 
The Court's standard in interpreting indemnity provisions 
purporting to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence 
is set forth in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965) as follows: 
The majority rule appears to be that in 
most situations, where such is the desire 
of the parties, and it is clearly 
understood and expressed, such a covenant 
will be upheld. But the presumption is 
against any such intention, and it is not 
achieved by inference or implication from 
general language such as employed here. It 
will be regarded as a binding contractual 
obligation only when the intention is 
clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
The general language used in the indemnity provision at hand 
would not rebut the presumption against any intention by YESCO 
to indemnify Marveon for its own negligence. The Purchase 
Agreement provided that YESCO would "provide, at its expense, 
insurance coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon] against 
. . . personal injury or death claims arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use, service, transportation or 
installation of displays in a minimum amount of one million 
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dollars ($1,000,000.00)." The Purchase Agreement goes on to 
say that, "buyer [YESCO] assumes no liabilities or obligations 
of seller [Marveon] unless as specifically described and set 
forth herein." (Purchase Agreement, Section 2.b. at p. 3, 
Addendum Exhibit "E"). Clearly, this sort of language does not 
seem to be sufficient to rebut the presumption of an intention 
by YESCO to indemnify Marveon for Marveon's own negligence. 
Certainly, YESCO did not "specifically describe" its intention 
to indemnify Marveon for Marveon's own negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that language much 
more specific than the language in the Purchase Agreement does 
not constitute a clear and unequivocal expression of the 
intentions of the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee's 
negligent acts. For example, in Howe Rents Corp. v. 
Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 1966), the language "shall 
be liable for all damages or loss of equipment regardless of 
cause" was held not clear enough to support indemnification 
when the indemnitee was negligent. Marveon is attempting to 
make an end run around this rule of law recognized in Utah by 
arguing that this was a contract to insure and not a contract 
of indemnification. 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light, 625 F. Supp. 272, 278 
(D. Utah 1985) appears to apply otherwise. In that case, the 
Court said, "[I]t is plain that unless the contract clearly and 
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unequivocally deals with the indemnitee's negligence, the 
indemnitee will not be indemnified against its own 
negligence.11 The Utah Supreme Court has never made a 
determination of whether or not an agreement to insure which is 
designed to provide indemnification should be construed 
strictly as in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., supra, and Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, supra. 
This is an issue for this Court to determine. YESCO 
respectfully asserts that the determination of the appellate 
court is not in accord with existing Utah case law. 
POINT II 
INDEMNIFICATION IS NOT THE PROPER MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In the event that this Court were to agree with the 
Court of Appeals1 Amended Decision, the language of the 
decision is internally inconsistent and insufficient to resolve 
the present problem. In its decision, Pickhover v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 106 Utah Adv. Rptr. 43 (April 11, 1989), 
the Court states: [a]n agreement to purchase insurance does not 
make the party agreeing to provide the insurance an 
indemnitor." M . at 45. The court goes on to say that it 
reject[s] YESCOfs contention that the 
strict construction rule applies to 
agreements to purchase insurance for 
another's benefit. We hold that the rule 
applies only to indemnity provisions where 
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the indemnitee seeks indemnification for 
the consequences of its own negligence. 
If a party contractually agrees to 
purchase insurance for another, the 
agreement is to be construed under general 
contract principles and, if the insurance 
is not obtained, the party is liable for 
breach of contract. 
Id. at 46 (emphasis added). Yet, in spite of this language, 
the court went on to affirm the decision of the trial court 
which granted Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment on a theory 
of indemnification. 
In August of 1985, Marveon answered the plaintiffs' 
Complaint in the underlying action and cross-claimed against 
the other defendants, including YESCO. (See Answer and 
Cross-Claim, Addendum Exhibit "F.") 
Paragraph 7 alleges "this defendant is entitled to be 
fully indemnified by cross-defendants." (Emphasis added.) 
Nowhere in Marveon's cross-claim is there a reference or 
allegation for breach of contract against YESCO. In October of 
1986, Marveon filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against 
YESCO asserting that "Marveon is entitled to be indemnified 
by Young Electric for the full amount of any such judgment up 
to one million dollars . . . " Subsequently, the trial court 
granted Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment (see Order and 
Judgment, Addendum, Exhibit "C") and stated as follows: "NOW, 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: Judgment be, 
and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon and against YESCO 
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that in the event a judgment is returned in favor of plaintiffs 
and against Marveon that Marveon is entitled to be 
indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of any such judgment 
up to one million dollars, . . . " (Emphasis added) 
Essentially what has happened here is that the 
Appeals Court has determined that there was a breach of 
contract by YESCO by reason of its failure to purchase 
insurance on behalf of Marveon. The Court affirmatively states 
that the Agreement is to be construed under general contract 
principles and that if the insurance was not obtained, the 
party that failed to purchase the insurance is liable for 
breach of contract. It is Hornbook Law that "as a general 
rule, damages for breach of contract are limited to the 
pecuniary loss sustained." 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 751 
(1988). Nonetheless, the Court has allowed Marveon a judgment 
for indemnification for any amount of judgment assigned to it 
notwithstanding there has been no determination of Marveon's 
pecuniary loss. This anomalous result has occurred because the 
Court of Appeals has analyzed this case from the point of view 
of breach of contract whereas the parties in the dispute have 
approached the case as one that should be determined under 
rules of indemnification. Consequently, it is not only 
appropriate but important that this Court review the 
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determination of the appellate court and grant YESCOfs 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
POINT III 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO 
PROVIDE INSURANCE TO MARVEON UNDER THE TERMS OF 
THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals 
apparently addressed YESCOfs counter argument to the 
Motion for Judgment of Marveon that in no event was YESCO 
obligated to purchase insurance for Marveon because Marveon had 
breached material provisions of the Purchase Agreement. 
Specifically, YESCO argued to the trial court and to the Court 
of Appeals that there were material issues of fact before the 
court which should have precluded the court from granting 
Marveon1s Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, YESCO 
argued that Marveon was in breach of its maintenance agreement 
with Smith's Food King on the sign in question. This 
maintenance agreement was purchased by YESCO in 1981. YESCO 
asserted vigorously that the failure to properly maintain the 
sign prior to YESCO's purchase of the Marveon assets obviated 
the necessity of YESCO to provide insurance naming Marveon. In 
other words, it was YESCO's assertion that Marveon's promise 
that it had not breached any of its contracts, which were to be 
purchased by YESCO, was material to YESCO's reciprocal 
promise to purchase insurance for Marveon. The jury verdict 
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specifically noted that Marveon was in breach of its 
maintenance agreement with Smith's. As a consequence, YESC0 
asserts that it had no obligation to purchase insurance on 
behalf of Marveon and that the granting of Marveon's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was inappropriate and premature as a matter of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
YESCO respectfully asserts that the issues presented 
in this case, particularly with respect to the 
interpretation of agreements to provide insurance and other 
indemnification agreements, are important questions of state 
law which have not been adequately settled, but should be, by 
this Court. Further, YESCO respectfully asserts that the 
decision issued by the Court of Appeals is in conflict with 
prior decisions of this Court and that the decision as rendered 
calls for this Court's exercise of its power of supervision 
over the Court of Appeals. The Purchase Agreement between 
Marveon and YESCO is essentially an agreement to indemnify. 
Consequently, it should be interpreted pursuant to the rule of 
strict interpretation currently in force in Utah. Further, the 
decision of the Appellate Court is internally inconsistent in 
that it provides a measure of damages not congruent with its 
determination that there was a breach of contract. Finally, in 
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no event was YESCO required to purchase insurance for Marveon 
because Marveon failed to live up to its contractual 
obligations. As a consequence, YESCO respectfully requests 
that this Court grant its Petition for Writ of Certiorari in 
order to review the decision of the Court of Appeals entered 
April 11, 1989. 
DATED this }& day of June, 1989. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSQ1 
Appe] 
Electric Sic Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were hand delivered on this / ^ — day 
of June, 1989, to the following counsel of record: 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place - 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
PICK5/MMW 
sm061289 
6049-136 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" 
C O D E • CO 
Provo, Utah 
Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corporation (A) 
106 Utah Adv Rep>43 43 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987). 
Cite as 
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Toshiko PICKHOVER, an individual and 
personal representative of the Estate of John 
W. Pickhover; Catherine Pickhover, an 
individual; and Gloria Pickhover, an 
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SMITH'S MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; 
Smith's Food King Properties, a Utah 
corporation; Dee's, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah 
corporation; and Image National, Inc., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendants and Appellant, 
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Marveon Inc., a Utah corporation, 
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No. 880193-CA 
FILED: April 11,1989 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
ATTORNEYS; 
Michael S. Mohrman, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Robert H. Henderson, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and 
Orme. 
AMENDED OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
This appeal involves a dispute between two 
defendants in a wrongful death action, Young 
Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") and 
Marveon, Inc. YESCO appeals the trial 
court's order holding YESCO responsible for 
any judgment against Marveon in the wron-
gful death action. We affirm. 
FACTS 
YESCO and Marveon were competitors in 
the commercial sign business until YESCO 
purchased Marveon's assets in August of 
1981. To effect this transaction, a written 
purchase agreement was entered into by the 
parties. Section 2(a) of the purchase agreement 
provides that "[YESCO] agrees ... to provide, 
at its expense, insurance coverage adequate to 
fully protect [MarveonJ against property 
damage ... or personal injury or death claims 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
use, service, transportations [sic], or installa-
tion of [signs] in a minimum amount of One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)." YESCO 
failed to provide such insurance coverage for 
Marveon. 
On January 5, 1985, John Pickhover was 
killed when a sign at a Smith's Food King in 
Sandy, Utah, fell and struck him. The sign 
had been installed by Marveon in 1978. This 
wrongful death action was subsequently 
brought by Pickhover's widow against 
YESCO, Marveon, and a number of other 
defendants. 
Marveon cross-claimed and immediately 
moved for summary judgment against 
YESCO. Citing section 2(a) of the purchase 
agreement, Marveon argued that YESCO was 
obligated to provide insurance coverage ade-
quate to protect Marveon from any liability 
arising from the installation of the sign, at 
least to the extent of one million dollars. 
Marveon sought a determination that YESCO 
was liable, in the event that judgment be 
entered against Marveon, because YESCO 
failed to provide the insurance policy as req-
uired by the purchase agreement. 
The trial court granted Marveon's motion 
on.October 31, 1986, before any judgment had 
been rendered in the underlying wrongful 
death action.1 The trial court ruled that 
Marveon was entitled to indemnification by 
YESCO for up to one million dollars, the 
amount specified in the purchase agreement. 
YESCO challenges the trial court's ruling 
and raises only one issue on appeal: Does 
section 2(a) of the purchase agreement require 
YESCO to provide an insurance policy cove-
ring the financial consequences of Marveon's 
own negligence?2 YESCO argues that, under 
Utah law, an indemnity contract purportedly 
requiring one party to assume responsibility 
for the financial consequences of another's 
negligence must be strictly construed against 
such coverage absent clear and unequivocal 
language. Furthermore, YESCO claims that an 
agreement to provide insurance for the benefit 
of another, such as the agreement contained in 
section 2(a) of the purchase agreement, is 
analogous to an indemnity agreement and, 
therefore, the same standard of strict interpr-
etation is applicable. Accordingly, YESCO 
asserts that because the purchase agreement 
does not expressly provide that the insurance 
coverage to be furnished will cover Marveon's 
own negligence, YESCO is not liable to 
Marveon because any judgment against 
Marveon in the underlying wrongful death 
action would necessarily be based on 
Marveon's own negligence. 
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The Court, upon finding the defen-
dant, Arden M. Barlow, in contempt, 
sentenced him to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Kane County Jail 
for ten (10) days, to run concurrently 
with the jail term imposed for the 
offense of Written False Statement, 
and fined the sum of Three Hundred 
Dollars ($300.00)/ 
No order appears in the record reciting the facts 
forming the basis for the finding of contempt. 
Thus, through no fault of appellant, appellate 
review of the contempt finding is not possible. In 
addition, Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10 (1987) 
limits the maximum fine that may be imposed on 
a contempt judgement of $200. 
The portion of the judgment sentencing appel-
lant for contempt is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the trial court for entry of approp-
riate findings and a judgment consistent with this 
decision. The remainder of the judgment, sent-
ence, and commitment is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
This appeal involves a dispute between two 
defendants in a wrongful death action, Young 
Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") and Marveon, 
Inc. YESCO appeals the trial court's order 
holding YESCO responsible for any judgment 
against Marveon in the wrongful death action. 
We affirm the trial court's basic disposition of 
the liability issue but remand for further procee-
dings to establish the appropnate damages. 
FACTS 
YESCO and Marveon were competitors in the 
commercial sign business until YESCO purchased 
Marveon's assets in August of 1981. To effect 
this transaction, a written purchase agreement was 
entered into by the parties. Section 2(a) of the 
purchase agreement provides that "[YESCO] 
agrees ... to provide, at its expense, insurance 
coverage adequate to fully protect [Marveon] 
against property damage ... or personal injury or 
death claims arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance, use, service, transportations [sic], or 
installation of [signs] in a minimum amount of 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)/ YESCO 
failed to provide such insurance coverage for 
Marveon. 
On January 5, 1985, John Pickhover was killed 
when a sign at a Smith's Food King in Sandy, 
Utah, fell and struck him. The sign had been 
installed by Marveon in 1978. This wrongful 
death action was subsequently brought by Pick-
hover's widow against YESCO, Marveon, and a 
number of other defendants. 
Marveon cross-claimed and immediately 
moved for summary judgment against YESCO. 
Citing section 2(a) of the purchase agreement, 
Marveon argued that YESCO was obligated to 
provide insurance coverage adequate to protect 
Marveon from any liability arising from the inst-
allation of the sign, at least to the extent of one 
million dollars. Marveon sought a determination 
that YESCO was liable, in the event that judg-
ment be entered against Marveon, because 
YESCO failed to provide the insurance policy as 
required by the purchase agreement. 
The trial court granted Marveon's motion on 
October 31, 1986, before any judgment had been 
rendered in the underlying wrongful death action.1 
.The trial court ruled that Marveon was entitled 
to indemnification by YESCO for up to one 
million dollars, the amount specified in the pur* 
chase agreement. 
YESCO challenges the trial court's ruling and 
raises only one issue on appeal: Does section 2(a) 
of the purchase agreement require YESCO to 
provide an insurance policy covering the financial 
consequences of Marveon's own negligence?2 
YESCO argues that, under Utah law, an indem-
nity contract purportedly requiring one party to 
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assume responsibility for the financial conseque- 1 
nces of another's negligence must be strictly 
construed against such coverage absent clear and 
unequivocal language. Furthermore, YESCO 
claims that an agreement to provide insurance for 
the benefit of another, such as the agreement 
contained in section 2(a) of the purchase agree-
ment, is analogous to an indemnity agreement 
and, therefore, the same standard of strict inter- I 
pretation is applicable. Accordingly, YESCO 
asserts that because the purchase agreement does 
not expressly provide that the insurance coverage 
to be furnished will cover Marveon's own negli-
gence, YESCO is not liable to Marveon because 
any judgment against Marveon in the underlying 
wrongful death action would necessarily be based 
on Marveon's own negligence. I 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS 
YESCO is correct in asserting that Utah courts 
apply the rule of strict construction when confr-
onted with an indemnity agreement and the claim 
that, through such an agreement, one party has 
shifted financial responsibility for its own negli-
gence onto the other party. See, e.g., Shell Oil 
Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.t 658 P.2d I 
1187, 1189 (Utah 1983); Union Pac R.R. v. Int-
ermountain Farmers Ass'n* 568 P.2d 724, 725-
26 (Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 
18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966); Union 
Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 
2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (1965). Sec also 
Bamis v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d 
207, 208 (1965). The strict construction rule seems 
to have arisen primarily to appease the concern 
that one who is not financially responsible for the 
consequences of his or her own negligence will be 
less careful in his or her behavior toward others. See, 
e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 408 P.2d at 913. Under the strict cons-
truction rule, a party is contractually obligated to 
assume ultimate financial responsibility for the 
negligence of another "only when that intention is I 
clearly and unequivocally expressed/ Id. at 914. 
'But the presumption is against any such inten-
tion, and it is not achieved by inference or impl-
ication from general language — "Id. 
RECENT FEDERAL CASES 
YESCO is also correct in asserting that the federal 
courts, endeavoring to apply Utah law, have held 
that *(a] requirement to provide insurance is 
governed by the same rule of [strict] construction 
as an indemnification provision which seeks ind-
emnification for the indemnitee's own neglig-
ence/ Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 625 F. 
Supp. 272, 280 (D. Utah 1985) (citing Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 730 F.2d 
1380 (10th Cir. 1984)). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit 
addressed the precise issue in Kennecott Copper 
and held that: 
[Defendant] has tried to distinguish 
the indemnification cases by arguing 
that there is a difference between an 
agreement to purchase insurance to 
cover [another's] own acts and an 
indemnification agreement. There is 
no support for that position in Utah 
Management Corp; _ 
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cases. See Union Pacific Railroad, 568 
P.2d at 725, and cases cited therein. It 
is clear from reading the Utah cases 
that Utah looks to the purpose of the 
agreement. If the purpose is to insure 
[another] against its own acts, that 
constitutes an indemnification agree-
ment, and the presumptions against it 
prevail in the absence of a clearly 
expressed contrary intent. 
730 F.2d at 1382. However, Kennecott Copper 
misconstrues Utah law. 
The Utah cases referred to by the Tenth Circuit 
in Kennecott Copper do not support its conclu-
sion that contracts to provide insurance are 
subject to the strict construction rule. Those cases 
involve classic indemnity provisions and make no 
attempt to analogize such provisions to an agre-
ement to provide insurance. See, e.g., Union Pac. 
R.R. v. Intennountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 
at 725; Howe Rents Corp., 420 P.2d at 849; Barrus, 
398 P.2d at 208. We are not cited to any 
Utah case actually supporting the position endo-
rsed in Kennecott Copper and Freund. Our own 
research has not revealed such a case. The issue 
appears to be one of first impression for the 
appellate courts of this state. 
We are convinced that an agreement to provide 
insurance for another's benefit, while analogous 
in some respects to an agreement, to indemnify 
another for the consequences of its own neglig-
ence, is not subject to the strict construction rule. 
Our conclusion is prompted by the emerging trend 
to limit application of the strict construction rule, 
analysis of the function served by an agreement to 
provide insurance, and well-reasoned cases from 
other jurisdictions. 
TREND TO LIMIT RULE 
It appears that the contemporary judicial trend is 
to limit the application of the strict construction 
rule. Especially given the judicial history df the 
rule in Utah, we believe the law of Utah should 
develop consistent with this trend. 
Early on, the Utah Supreme Court stated "[i]t 
is very doubtful that defendant could relieve itself 
by contract from its own negligence. Ordinarily, 
such contracts are contrary to public policy." Jankele 
v. Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425, 
427 (1936). A generation later, the Court moder-
ated its view and was able to hold that indemnity 
contracts, even where they are for the purpose of 
providing relief from one's own negligence, are 
valid if they pass muster under the strict constr-
uction rule. See, e.g., Walker Bank St Trust Co. 
v. First Sec. Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 
947 (1959). This change in Utah judicial attitude 
may well have been prompted by the position 
adopted by the majority of jurisdictions uphol-
ding indemnity provisions, which was no doubt 
attributable to the ever-increasing use of liability 
insurance. See Manson-Osbcrg Co. v. Alaska, 
552 P.2d 654, 659 (Alaska 1976). Courts recogn-
ized that many insurance contracts effectively 
shift the financial burden for the insured's own 
negligence onto the insurer. Accordingly, it would 
make little sense to altogether prohibit indemnity 
agreements intended to do the same, on public 
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policy grounds, while embracing their insurance 
agreement cousins. 
Nowr coming full circle, courts are beginning to 
change their view of the strict construction rule. 
At least one jurisdiction has all but abandoned 
the rule. See C.J.M. Constr. Inc. v. Chandler 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 708 P.2d 60, 64 
(Alaska 1985) ('It is no longer necessary under 
Alaska law that an indemmty clause contain 
words specifying indemmty for the indemnitee's 
own negligence."); Manson-Osberg Co. v. 
Alaska, 552 P.2d 654, 659 (Alaska 1976) ("In 
modern commerce, indemnity clauses are no 
longer so unusual as to require such specific 
mention of the indemnitee's conduct as being 
within the scope of the indemnifying obliga-
tion."). Other courts have moderated their appli-
cation of the rule. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Davis 
Corp., 219 Kan. 148, 547 P.2d 800, 808 (1976) 
("Although recognizing the [strict construction] 
rule, a great majority of courts hold that it is not 
necessary that the agreement contain specific or 
express language covering the [indemnitee's] 
negligence, if the intention to afford such prote-
ction clearly appears from the contract, the surr- I 
ounding circumstances and the purposes and ] 
objects of the parties."); Simons v. Tri-State 
Constr. Co., 33 Wash. App. 315, 655 P.2d 703, 
708 (1982) (clauses purporting to indemnify a 
party for its, own negligence are to be strictly 
construed against such coverage, but the clause 
must be viewed realistically to recognize the intent 
of the parties to allocate the cost or expense of 
certain risks among themselves). Even if we were 
more enamored of the strict construction rule, we 
would be reluctant to expand the rule's applica-
tion to agreements to provide insurance while 
other jurisdictions are restricting its application. 
FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Two aspects of the typical agreement to provide 
insurance support our conclusion. First, a contr-
actual entitlement to insurance provided by 
another does not encourage the beneficiary of 
that agreement to act any more irresponsibly than 
the insurance policy itself would. Of course, Utah 
cases have not applied the indemnity-type strict 
construction rule to actual insurance policies.3 In 
our view, it would be irrational and inconsistent 
to apply the rule to agreements to provide insur-
ance simply because the insured has negotiated 
with a third party to pay the insurance premium. 
An agreement to provide insurance merely alloc-
ates an economic burden on one party to make a 
payment to protect another after the parties have 
ultimately decided "to shift the risk of loss ... 
upon an insurer." Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. 
Bacjac Indus., 701 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo. App. 
1985). Thus, we think an agreement to provide 
insurance is more analogous to an insurance 
contract, to which the strict construction rule does 
not apply, than to an indemnity agreement. 
Second, our conclusion advances the bargained-
for expectations of the parties. It is commonly 
understood that insurance of the type contempl-
ated in the purchase agreement is purchased to 
protect the named insured from the financial 
consequences of its own negligence. An agreement 
Management Corp. CODE^ CO 
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to purchase insurance does not make the party 
agreeing to provide the insurance an indemnitor. 
Rather, 
an agreement to insure is an agreement 
to provide both parties with the ben-
efits of insurance. Individuals under-
stand that insurance will protect them 
against the consequences of their own 
negligence and more than likely 
assume that if one ... agrees as part of 
his or its [contractual] duties to 
provide insurance, that the insurance 
will protect both of them regardless of 
the cause of the loss.... If that were 
not their intent, each would provide 
his or its own protection.... 
South Tippecanoe School Bldg. v. Shambaugh & 
Son, Inc., 182 Ind. App. 350, 395 N.E.2d 320, 
327 (1979) (quoting Morsches Lumber v. Probst, 
180 Ind. App. 202, 388 N.E.2d 284, 286-87 
(1979)). 
SUPPORTIVE CASE LAW 
Our conclusion is also supported by recent cases 
from other jurisdictions. These decisions treat an 
agreement to provide insurance as a matter of 
simple contract and not as a matter of indemnity. 
See, e.g., Steamboat Dev. Corp., 701 P.2d at 128; 
Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Ashland-Warren, 
Inc., 458 So.2d 851, 855-56 (Fla. App. 1984), cert, 
denied, 464 So.2d 554 (Ha. 1985); Hooks v. 
Southeast Constr. Corp., 538 F.2d 431, 433 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. L.K. 
Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. Nev. 
1980); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. H.C. Price 
Co., 694'P.2d 782, 785-86 (Alaska 1985); Ramsey v. 
Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72 
Cal.App.3d 516, 140 Cal.Rptr. 247, 258 (1977)* 
Two of these cases are particularly compelling 
and merit further discussion. 
In Cone Bros. Contracting, the parties had 
contractually agreed that a subcontractor would 
indemnify the contractor. The subcontractor also 
agreed to purchase an insurance policy naming 
the contractor as an insured party. As in this 
case, the insurance policy was not obtained. After 
a personal injury action was brought against the 
contractor, it sued the subcontractor. The trial 
court dismissed the contractor's claim based on 
the indemnification clause, but entered judgment 
against the subcontractor for breaching the agre-
ement to purchase insurance for the contractor. 
458 So.2d at 854. The subcontractor appealed and 
argued that the agreement to provide insurance 
did not 1) expressly provide that the contractor 
was to be protected from liability for its own 
negligence or 2) comply with a Florida statute 
requiring certain terms to be included in a cont-
ract purporting to indemnify one for its own 
negligence. Id* 
The Florida Court of Appeals rejected both 
arguments and upheld the trial court's imposition 
of liability on the subcontractor for breaching the 
agreement to purchase insurance. Id. at 855-56. 
In affirming, the court distinguished the indem-
nity clause from the contractual obligation to 
provide insurance. The court held that while the 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
CODE mco Pickhover v. Smith's 
Provo, Utah 103 Utah A 
contractor's claim based on the indemmty prov-
ision was properly dismissed pursuant to the strict 
construction rule, there was no merit in the sub-
contractor's contention that the claim for breach 
of the agreement to provide insurance must like-
wise be dismissed. Further distinguishing the two 
claims, the court held that the Florida statute "is 
clearly a limitation upon indemnification and has 
no applicability to a contract provision relating to 
insurance...." Id. at 856. 
In Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. Bacjac Indus., 701 
P.2d 127 (Colo. App. 1985), a property owner 
agreed to provide an insurance policy in favor of 
a contractor working on the owner's property. 
The agreement stated only that the "insurance 
shall include the interest of the ... contractor." Id. 
at 128. The agreement did not expressly provide 
that the insurance would protect the contractor 
from the financial consequences of its own negl-
igence. Nonetheless, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 
owner could not recover damages arising from the 
contractor's alleged negligence as the owner had 
'breached the contract by failing to obtain all risk 
insurance in favor of the contractor,' id., which 
would have covered the owner's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject YESCO's 
contention that the strict construction rule applies 
to agreements to purchase insurance for another's 
benefit. We hold that the rule applies only to 
indemnity provisions where the indemnitee seeks 
indemnification for the consequences of its own 
negligence. If a party contractually agrees to 
purchase insurance for another, the agreement is 
to be construed under general contract principles4 
and, if the insurance is not obtained, the party is 
liable for breach of contract. 
Applying this analysis to section 2(a) of the 
purchase agreement, it is clear that both YESCO 
and Marveon believed, understood, and contrac-
tually agreed that YESCO would provide insur-
ance coverage to protect Marveon from all perti-
nent claims, including those resulting from its 
own negligence. The provision is couched in 
broad terms: YESCO will "provide, at its 
expense, insurance coverage adequate to fully 
protect [Marveon] against property damage ... or 
personal injury or death claims arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, use, service, transport-
ations [sic], or installation of [signs] in a 
minimum amount of One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000.00)." YESCO is able to suggest no set 
of circumstances where that provision would be 
of any real benefit to Marveon if the policy did 
not cover Marveon in a case like the instant one. Cf. 
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mec-
hanical Contractors, 242 Or. 1, 406 P.2d 556, 566 
(1965) ("It cannot be assumed that in negotiations 
for a contract a party knowingly asks for somet-
hing which would be of no value to him."). 
Marveon sold its assets to YESCO and left the 
sign business. As part of the arrangement, 
Marveon desired insurance protection of the most 
comprehensive sort, including, to the extent pos-
sible, for past acts of negligence not yet manife-
sted. Section 2(a) merely placed the economic 
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burden to purchase the insurance on YESCO as 
part of the consideration for Marveon's assets. 
YESCO breached its agreement and is liable to 
Marveon for that breach. 
However, we are convinced that this case must 
be remanded for consideration of the compens-
able damages Marveon suffered as a result of 
YESCO'S breach. In an action for breach of a 
contract to provide insurance, the measure of 
general damages, at least in cases like the instant 
one, is the amount the policy would have paid 
had it been obtained. See, e.g., PPG Indust. v. 
Continental Heller Corp., 124 Ariz. 216, 603 P.2d 
108, 113-114 (1979) (where insurance contracted 
for would have provided primary coverage, 
damages included full amount paid by contracting 
party's own insurer). 
Under the facts of this case, the calculation of 
damages is somewhat problematic. Marveon had 
sufficient insurance coverage for the Pickhover 
claim under the terms of a policy in effect at the 
time the Smith's sign was installed by Marveon. 
In a sense, then, Marveon itself was not damaged 
by YESCO's breach. However, Marveon's 
insurer stands in Marveon's shoes. See Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-21-108 (1986). See also PPG 
Indust., 603 P.2d at 114. Marveon's insurer is 
damaged to the extent it had to pay a 'claim it 
would not have had to pay, at least in full, but 
for YESCO's breach. Because both Marveon's 
own insurance policy and the policy YESCO was 
obligated to provide Marveon would provide 
potential coverage for the claim in question, the 
recoverable damages in this case are the amount 
which would have been paid under the YESCO 
policy had it been provided. On remand, the 
court must determine an appropriate allocation 
between the two policies, with reference to the 
terms of Marveon's actual policy and the prob-
' able terms of the policy YESCO should have 
furnished. Of prime importance is the primary, 
secondary, or concurrent nature of the two poli-
cies. No doubt expert testimony from insurance 
brokers, underwriters, and the like, coupled with 
the wide use of standardized, preprinted policy 
provisions, will allow the court to reconstruct 
with some accuracy the terms of the policy 
YESCO agreed to provide. 
The parties shall bear their own costs of this 
appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
| WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Eventually, Mrs. Pickhover's wrongful death 
action was successful. Relief m her favor included a 
judgment against Marveon based on its negligent 
installation of the Smith's Food King sign that 
killed her husband. 
2. Marveon also challenges this court's jurisdiction. 
After entenng judgment m Marveon's favor and 
against YESCO, the trial court certified its judgment 
as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). YESCO 
filed its appeal based on this certification. Marveon 
claims the trial court erred in certifying its order 
under Rule 54(b) because it did not wholly dispose 
of Marveon's claim against YESCO. However, 
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Marveon previously moved for dismissal on this 
very ground. That motion was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court before the case was transferred to 
this court. We are not inclined to disturb the 
Supreme Court's disposition of this issue and reject 
Marveon's jurisdictional challenge. See Condcr v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
a . App. 1987). 
3. On the contrary, the "strict construction" rule 
that is employed in connection with insurance poli-
cies accomplishes just the opposite result. Any 
ambiguity concerning the scope of insurance is 
construed in favor of coverage. See, e.g.. Fuller v. 
Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985) ("An insured is entitled to the broadest prot-
ection he could have reasonably understood to be 
provided by the policy."); Williams v. First Colony 
Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) 
(ambiguity in insurance contract must be construed 
in favor of insured); Dienes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 
21 Utah 2d 147, 442 P.2d 468, 471 (1968) (no 
ambiguous statement may be enforced against an 
insured). See also Colard v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 14 (Colo. App. 1985) (if an 
insurance company intends to exclude from coverage 
damage resulting from the insured's own negligence, 
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American 
Excess Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 729 
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Nev. 1986) (insurance contracts are 
construed to accomplish the object of providing 
indemnity to the insured); Weldon v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co., 103 N.M. 522, 710 P.2d 89, 
91 (1985) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court 
must construe the policy so as to sustain indem-
nity."). 
4. Under different facts, the lack of explicit lang-
uage clearly indicating an intent to provide coverage 
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the 
question of whether such coverage was intended. 
However, such ambiguity would be resolved through 
the ordinary rules of contract interpretation rather 
than by invoking the strict construction rule. See' 
generally Wilbum v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 
582,585-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The State of Utah filed an interlocutory appeal 
challenging the district court's suppression of 
cocaine seized after a Utah Highway trooper 
stopped Jose Francisco Arroyo ("Arroyo1') for an 
alleged traffic violation. The trial court fo>ind the 
stop of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which 
violated Arroyo's fourth amendment rights. We 
reverse. 
FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 
1987, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mang-
elson ("Trooper Mangelson") was driving home 
after completing his shift an hour earlier. Trooper 
Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near 
Nephi, Utah, when he observed a northbound 
truck-camper following the car in front of it too 
closely. Trooper Mangelson made a U-turn 
through the median and caught up with Arroyo's 
truck. 
Trooper Mangelson observed that the truck was 
following the vehicle in from of him at a distance 
of three to eight car lengths at a speed of appro-
ximately fifty miles per hour. Trooper Mangelson 
pulled alongside the truck in order to observe its 
occupants and estimate the truck's speed. 
Trooper Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his 
passenger were Hispanic, and he stopped the 
truck. 
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "following too 
closely" and for driving on an expired driver's 
license. Trooper Mangelson then asked Arroyo if 
he could search his truck, and Arroyo agreed. 
The search revealed approximately one kilo-
gram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel. 
Trooper Mangelson then arrested Arroyo for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-8(l)(a)(i) (1986), a second degree felony. 
Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine claiming 
Trooper Mangelson's traffic stop was a pretext to 
search his truck for evidence of a more serious 
crime. The trial court found no traffic violation 
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangelson's 
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to investi-
gate a vehicle he found suspicious because of out-
of-state license plates and Hispanic occupants. 
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the 
subsequent search of his truck, but nevertheless, 
granted the motion to suppress. The State 
appeals. 
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that Trooper Mangelson's 
stop of Arroyo for "following too closely" was a 
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo's subseq-
uent consent to the search of his truck purged the 
taint of the otherwise unconstitutional stop.1 
The trial court's factual evaluation underlying 
its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, et al.f 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C85-4307 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant, Marveon, Inc.'s (Marveon) Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Defendant Young Electric Sign Company (YESCO) 
came on regularly for Hearing before The Honorable Scott Daniels 
at the Law and Motion calendar at 10:00 a.m. on October 31, 1986. 
Each party was represented by counsel. The Court heard the 
arguments of Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau on behalf of Marveon and Michael K. Mohrman of the 
law firm Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson on behalf of YESCO. 
The Court fully reviewed the Memoranda on file and the Court 
was fully advised. 
"fc . 
The Court concludes that in the event any judgment is 
returned in -favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon, that 
Marveon is entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full 
amount of any such judgment up to $1,000,000 and that YESCO 
be required to pay Marveon's costs and attorneys1 fees from 
and after the date of the tender of the defense of Marveon 
to YESCO. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
That Marveon's Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
YESCO be, and hereby is granted. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED THAT: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of Marveon 
and against YESCO that in the event any judgment is returned 
in favor of plaintiffs and against Marveon that Marveon is 
entitled to be indemnified by YESCO for the full amount of 
any such judgment up to $1,000,000, and that YESCO pay Marveon's 
costs and attorneys' fees from and after the date of the tender 
of defense of Marveon to YESCO. 
DATED this day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
£QUCLI i I x l l 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
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ment. Such a promise is alone not enough 
to establish a claim, but when coupled with 
an employee's reliance, it is sufficient to 
raise triable issues of fact. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Counts I, II 
and III of Abel's complaint are hereby dis-
missed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Donald J. FREUND, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah corpo-
ration; and Cablemain, Inc., a Texas 
corporation; Jones Intercable, Inc., a 
Colorado corporation; Cable TV Fund 
VIII-B, a Colorado partnership, and 
John Doe 1 through John Doe 25, In-
clusive, Defendants. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, and Cablemain, Inc., 
a Texas corporation, Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES INTERCABLE, INC., CP National 
Corporation, Cable TV Fund VIII-B, 
Konocti TV, Inc., and Alexander and 
Alexander, Third-Party Defendants. 
Argonaut Insurance Company, Plaintiff 
in Intervention. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CP NATIONAL CORP., et al., 
Defendants. 
Civ. Nos. C-82-0747W, C-84-0400W. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, CD. 
Nov. 25, 1985. 
Cable television company worker 
brought action against electric utility and 
company which had previously hung cable 
on utility pole for injuries sustained when 
he came in contact wih electrical power line 
while splicing amplifiers into cable. Com-
pany which had hung cable and electric 
utility asserted claims against cable tele-
vision company. The District Court, Win-
der, J., held that: (1) cable television com-
pany was employer of worker under Utah 
workmen's compensation law; (2) under 
Utah law, company which had hung cable 
was not entitled to assert common-law in-
demnity claim against cable television com-
pany; (3) facilities attachment agreement 
did not require cable television company to 
indemnify electric utility for utility's own 
negligence; and (4) facilities attachment 
agreement provision requiring cable tele-
vision company to provide liability insur-
ance for electric utility did not require lia-
bility insurance for utility's own negligent 
acts. 
Summary judgment granted for cable 
television company. 
1. Workers' Compensation e=»187 
For purposes of Utah workmen's com-
pensation Act [U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60] grant-
ing excjusive remedy, cable television com-
pany, its subsidiary and its limited partner 
were employers of worker who sustained 
injury while working on system of limited 
partnership, where cable television compa-
ny, as part of its management style, 
grouped all employees together under its 
direct control, rather than having subsidi-
ary or limited partner hire individually, and 
where worker's payroll checks and time 
sheets were handled by cable television 
company. 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>2142 
Under Utah law, agreement or promise 
of cable television company to indemnify 
company which hung cable could not be 
implied to avoid exclusive remedy provision 
of Utah Workmen's Compensation Act 
[U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60] in action by employ-
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ee of cable television company for injuries 
sustained when he came into contact with 
electrical power line while splicing amplifi-
ers into cable. 
3. Indemnity <8=>8.1(1) 
In determining whether indemnity pro-
vision expressed clear and unequivocal in-
tention of indemnitor to indemnify indemni-
tee from losses attributable to indemnity's 
own negligence, court must be guided by 
presumption against such intention and 
understanding that indemnity agreements 
are strictly construed against indemnitee. 
4. Indemnity <^8.1(2) 
Facilities attachment agreement pro-
viding that cable television company would 
indemnify electric utility for liability aris-
ing out of erection, maintenance, presence, 
use, or removal of cable television compa-
ny's equipment was not sufficiently explic-
it, under Utah law, to require cable tele-
vision company to indemnify electric utility 
for liability arising out of negligence of 
electric utility, absent express reference to 
obligation to indemnify for electric utility's 
negligence, even though another portion of 
such agreement provided that cable tele-
vision company would indemnify electric 
utility from claim or other liabilities arising 
from interruption of electric utility service. 
5. Workers' Compensation <§=>2142 
Absent clearly expressed intention to 
contract away cable television company's 
immunity or reference to cable television 
company's obligation to indemnify electric 
company for injuries caused to cable tele-
vision company's employees, facilities at-
tachment agreement providing that cable 
television company would indemnify elec-
tric utility for liability arising out of erec-
tion, maintenance, presence, and use, or 
removal of cable television company's 
equipment was insufficient to overcome 
presumption that cable television company 
did not contract away employer immunity 
under Utah Workmen's Compensation Act 
[U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60] 
6. Insurance G=»l 46.5(1) 
Under Utah law, intention of parties 
regarding insurance coverage must be 
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clearly and unequivocally expressed where 
action on insurance agreements sounds as 
action for indemnification. 
7. Indemnity <s=*8.1(l) 
Insurance <S=>433(1) 
There is presumption against insuring 
one's self against one's own acts in con-
struing agreement to purchase insurance 
to cover lessor's own acts or indemnifica-
tion provision which seeks indemnification 
for indemnitee's own negligence. 
8. Insurance <$=>104(3) 
Insurance provision of facilities attach-
ment agreement requiring cable television 
company to provide liability policy covering 
electric utility with respect to all liabilities 
arising out of agreement allowing cable 
television company to attach cables to utili-
ty poles did not require cable television 
company to provide liability policy for elec-
tric utility's own negligence, absent explicit 
provision stating that coverage must be 
provided to cover utility's own negligent 
acts. 
Ralph W. Bastian, Jr., San Francisco, 
Cal., Jackson Howard, D. David Lambert, 
Provo, Utah, for Donald J. Freund. 
Stephen B. Nebeker, Anthony B. Quinn, 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Robert Gordon, 
David A. Westerby, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Utah Power & Light Co. 
Scott W. Christensen, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for Home Ins. Co. 
Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Cablemain, Inc. 
Glenn C. Hanni, Paul M. Belnap, Gary A. 
Dodge, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Jones 
Intercable, Cable Fund and Konocti. 
Robert A. Aune, San Francisco, Cal., for 
Argonaut Ins. 
Robert W. Brandt, Robert G. Gilchrist, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for CP Nat. 
Donald J. Purser, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Fireman's Fund. 
Dale J. Lambert, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Alexander & Alexander. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
WINDER, District Judge. 
This matter is before the court on oppos-
ing motions for summary judgment filed by 
Utah Power and Light, Jones Intercable, 
Inc., et al, and by CP National. In addi-
tion, a motion to dismiss was filed by de-
fendant Home Insurance Company. Oral 
argument was made to the court on Octo-
ber 18, 1985. D. David Lambert, Ralph W. 
Bastian, Jr. and Robert E. Aune were 
present on behalf of plaintiff Freund. Rob-
ert W. Brandt and Michael P. Zaccheo ap-
peared on behalf of defendant C.P. Nation-
al. Glenn C. Hanni and Mark Taylor were 
present representing Jones Intercable, Ko-
nocti TV, Inc. and Cable TV Fund VIII-B. 
Stephen B. Nebeker, Anthony B. Quinn, 
Jeffery Eisenberg and David Westerby ap-
peared on behalf of Utah Power and Light. 
Allan L. Larson and Jerry D. Fenn ap-
peared on behalf of Cablemain Inc., while 
Scott W. Christensen appeared on behalf of 
Home Insurance. Gary Dodge was present 
representing Jones Intercable and Dale 
Lambert appeared on behalf of Alexander 
and Alexander. The court took the mo-
tions under advisement and has read care-
fully the various memoranda filed by the 
parties as well as pertinent sources cited 
therein. Being fully advised, the court 
now renders the following decision and or-
der. 
Factual Background 
This lawsuit arises out of an accident on 
October 11, 1981, in which the plaintiff, 
Donald R. Freund, was injured when he 
came in contact with an electrical power 
line. When injured, Freund was splicing 
amplifiers into cable previously h\mg by 
Cablemain on utility poles owned by Utah 
Power & Light. Freund was working at 
the time of the accident for Jones and Fund 
VIII-B in the construction of a cable TV 
system in Washington City, Utah. 
Mr. Freund has brought suit against Ca-
blemain and Utah Power & Light. Utah 
Power and Light, in turn, has asserted 
claims against Jones Intercable based upon 
a written agreement between the parties 
known as the Facilities Attachment Agree-
ment (hereinafter referred to as "FAA"). 
The FAA was originally negotiated be-
tween the predecessors-in-interest of Utah 
Power & Light and Jones Intercable, CP 
National and Summit Communications, re-
spectively. Under the terms of the FAA, 
the cable TV companies may attach cables 
to utility poles provided they agree to in-
demnify the utility company for injuries 
which result from their activities and ob-
tain liability insurance for the utility's ben-
efit. 
The present motions raise a number of 
issues. Cablemain's motion for summary 
judgment involves the issue of whether 
Jones, Fund VIII-B and Konocti were em-
ployers of Freund within the meaning of 
the Utah workmen's compensation laws 
and whether they may be liable to Cable-
main based on the theory o! implied com-
mon law indemnity. Both Utah Power & 
Light and CP National in their motions 
claim that under the terms of the FAA 
they are entitled to complete indemnity 
from Jones with respect to Fruend's per-
sonal injury claim. Utah Power & Light, in 
the alternative, claims that if it is found 
liable, it is entitled to recover an amount up 
to $500,000 based on Jones' alleged breach 
of the FAA agreement to provide liability 
insurance. Jones, in its motion, seeks a 
determination that it was the employer of 
Freund and as such is not liable to any 
party in the suit based on claims arising 
from either implied or express indemnity 
provisions. It maintains that workmen's 
compensation is the exclusive remedy here. 
After reviewing the record, and listening to 
the arguments, the court finds that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact so as 
to preclude the granting of summary judg-
ment pursuant to Fed.Rule Civ.Pro. 56. 
Jones, Cable VIII-B and Konocti as 
Statutory Employers 
[1] Cablemain contends that the record 
reveals a factual question regarding 
Freund's employer at the time of the acci-
dent. Cablemain asserts that it is possible 
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that Freund was employed by Konocti as 
opposed to Jones. The contradictory testi-
mony of Ronald Schmitt in his two deposi-
tions provides the basis for Cablemain's 
argument. 
The court after reviewing the record, 
however, finds the facts regarding 
Freund's employments are clear. Jones is 
a Colorado corporation, qualified to do busi-
ness in Utah. Fund VIII-B is a limited 
partnership, whose general and managing 
partner is Jones. Konocti is a California 
corporation and a subsidiary of Jones. The 
record shows that Jones, as part of its 
management style, groups all its employ-
ees together in one system under its direct 
control rather than having its subsidiary or 
limited partner hire individually. Because 
of this organizational style, Jones moves its 
experienced employees from one system to 
another to perform technical tasks associat-
ed with the cable TV business. Cable Fund 
VIII-B and Konocti have no employees but 
reimburse Jones for the use of its employ-
ees. In the present case, Freund worked 
at the Konocti location but was transferred 
by the Jones' management team to St. 
George to install components along the 
newly strung Fund VIII-B system cable. 
The facts reveal that Freund was em-
ployed by and controlled by Jones during 
the time relevant to this action. That is 
evidenced among other things by the pay-
roll checks and time sheets.1 It is also 
clear that Freund was working on the Fund 
VIII system at the time he was injured. 
There is no evidence that Konocti was in 
any way involved in the circumstances giv-
ing rise to this law suit. In the alternative, 
if Konocti was involved, it was as Freund's 
employer. Utah law recognizes that there 
may be multiple employers of an employee 
and all may be entitled to the workmen's 
compensation defense. Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The 
court finds that Jones, Fund VIII-B and 
Konocti are statutory employers of Freund 
and are therefore entitled to claim the ex-
1. Because of the undisputed evidence regarding 
the organizational relationship between Jones, 
Fund VIII-B, and Konocti, and the manner in 
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elusive remedy provisions of the work-
men's compensation law. 
Implied Indemnity 
12] Cablemain urges the court to find 
that an implied agreement to indemnify 
exists between Jones and Cablemain. Ca-
blemain contends that Jones or Cable Fund 
VIII-B directed Cablemain to install the 
cable and assured Cablemain that various 
problems relating to the cables' proximity 
to the powerline would be rectified prompt-
ly. Those assurances and directions form 
the basis for Cablemain's implied indemnity 
claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on whether an agreement or promise 
to indemnify might be implied in certain 
circumstances thereby avoiding the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. See Shell Oil Compa-
ny v. Brinkerhoff Signal Drilling Compa-
ny, 658 P.2d 1187, 1191 n. 3 (Utah 1983). 
Cablemain argues that the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applying Utah law in 
Barr v. Brezina Construction Co., 464 
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.1972) cert denied, Bre-
zina Construction Co. v. U.S., 409 U.S. 
1125, 93 S.Ct. 937, 35 L.Ed.2d 256 (1973), 
suggested that an implied promise to in-
demnify could have been found in that case 
under different facts. 
At this point in time, however, the Utah 
Supreme Court has not concluded that an 
implied indemnity agreement may exist in 
spite of the exclusiveness of Workmen's 
Compensation. Until the State court rules 
conclusively on this issue, this court will 
not second guess its conclusion. Cf. Ber-
toch v. Marriott Corporation, No. C82-
6029 (Dist.Ct, Utah, March 13, 1984). 
Moreover, the Utah court has considered 
and rejected any constitutional challenge to 
the exclusive remedy provision. Morrill v. 
J&M Construction Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1981). Cablemain's motion for summary 
judgment on the issue of common law in-
demnity is therefore denied. 
which employees were managed by Jones, the 
court concludes that Jones was also the employ-
er of Bond and Schmitt. 
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The Facilities Attachment Agreement 
[3] CP National, Utah Power & Light 
and Cablemain claim Jones, Fund VIII-B, 
and Konocti breached the terms of the Fa-
cilities Attachment Agreement (hereinafter 
referred to as "FAA"). They premise their 
claims on the assertion that the Jones com-
panies ("Jones'') assumed the FAA obli-
gations of Summit Communications to CP 
National and its assignee, Utah Power & 
Light. Jones has asserted that it did not 
assume the obligations of the FAA when it 
entered into the Purchase and Sale Agree-
ment with Summit Communications. 
For purposes of this motion only and in 
order to decide the legal significance of 
various controverted portions of the FAA, 
the court will ignore the factual issue and 
will assume that the FAA is enforceable 
between Utah Power & Light and Jones. 
Indemnification for Utah Power & 
LighVs Own Negligence 
Assuming that Jones and Fund VIII-B 
have undertaken the obligations of the 
FAA, the court must determine first, 
whether those obligations require Jones to 
indemnify Utah Power & Light for Utah 
Power & Light's negligence. Second, the 
court must determine whether the FAA 
would require Jones to reimburse Utah 
Power & Light based on Jones' alleged 
failure to provide Utah Power & Light with 
liability insurance. 
As mentioned previously, the FAA gov-
erned use of CP National's utility poles by 
Summit Communications. Paragraphs 20 
and 21 are indemnity provisions whose le-
gal significance is in dispute. Those para-
graphs state: 
20. The Licensee shall indemnify, pro-
tect, and save harmless the Licensor 
from any cause of action, claim, or other 
legal proceeding by the Licensee's sub-
scribers or other third persons against 
the Licensor in the event the continued 
use of poles owned by the Licensor is 
denied to Licensee for any reason. In 
addition the Licensee shall, upon demand 
and at its own risk and expense, defend 
any and all such actions, claims, or other 
legal proceedings. 
21. Licensee shall indemnify, pro-
tect, and save harmless Licensor from 
and against any and all claims, de-
mands, causes of action, costs or other 
liabilities for damages to property and 
injury or death to persons which may 
arise out of or be connected vrith the 
erection, maintenance, presence, use or 
removal of Licensee's equipment, or of 
structures, guys and anchors, used, in-
stalled or placed for the principal pur-
pose of supporting Licensee's equip-
ment or by any act of Licensee on or in 
the vicinity of Licensor's poles, includ-
ing, but not by way of limitation, pay-
ments made under workmen's compen-
sation laws. Except for intentional 
wrongdoing or willful negligence on the 
part of Licensor, or any of its agents or 
employees, Licensee shall also indemnify 
protect and save harmless Licensor from 
and against any and all claims, demands, 
causes of action, costs, or other liabilities 
arising from any interruption, discontin-
uance or interference with Licensee's 
service which may be occasioned or 
which may be claimed to have been occa-
sioned by any action of Licensor pursu-
ant to or consistent with this agreement. 
In addition, Licensee shall, upon demand 
and at its own sole risk and expense, 
defend any and all suits, actions or other 
legal proceedings which may be brought 
or instituted by third persons against 
Licensor or their successors or assigns 
on any such claim, demand or cause of 
action; shall pay and satisfy any said 
suit, action or other legal proceeding; 
and shall reimburse Licensor for any and 
all reasonable legal expenses incurred by 
Licensor in connection herewith. 
This indemnification agreement by Li-
censee in favor of Licensor, shall provide 
Licensor with full and complete indemni-
fication, including defense of any suits, 
actions or other legal proceedings result-
ing from any claims for damages to prop-
erty and injury or death to persons and 
shall apply to all claims, demands, suits, 
and judgments of whatever nature which 
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shall be made or assessed against Li-
censor in furnishing such poles under the 
terms of this agreement or for any other 
thing done or omitted in conjunction with 
Licensors dealings with Licensee. (Em-
phasis added). 
The first sentence of paragraph 21, un-
derlined above, covers the present factual 
situation. Jones argues that the sentence 
does not contain the kind of explicit lan-
guage required by Utah law in order to 
hold an indemnitor accountable for an in-
demnitee's own negligence. Utah Power & 
Light, on the other hand, asserts that the 
first sentence must be read in conjunction 
with the following sentence. The first sen-
tence is all inclusive, in contrast to the 
second which expressly excludes indemnifi-
cation for the licensor's wrongdoing. Ac-
cording to Utah Power & Light, the par-
ties' intention is clear: the utility company 
is to be indemnified under any and all situa-
tions which arise out of or are connected 
with "the erection, maintenance, presence, 
use, or removal" of Jones' equipment and 
the indemnitor is to indemnify the indemni-
tee regardless of who is at fault. Utah 
Power & Light further argues that Utah 
law does not require "buzz words" in order 
to require an indemnitor to indemnify the 
indemnitee for the latter's negligent acts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied a 
strict interpretation standard when inter-
preting indemnity provisions similar to the 
one now before the court. The Court set 
forth the standard in clear terms in the 
case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 
P.2d 910 (1965). The Court there was 
called upon to interpret an indemnity con-
tract given by a gas company seeking the 
use of the railroads' easements for a pipe-
line. Although some of the factors influ-
encing the court's deliberations in that case 
are not present here, the general tenor of 
the court's decision and its guidelines for 
interpreting indemnity contracts are impor-
tant. The court's conclusion favoring the 
gas company rested in large measure on 
the proposition that "the law does not look 
with favor upon one exacting a covenant to 
relieve himself of the basic duty which the 
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law imposes on everyone: that of using 
due care for the safety of himself and 
others." Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso, 
408 P.2d at 913. The court then stated its 
understanding of the majority rule regard-
ing the interpretation of covenants purport-
ing to indemnify the indemnitee for its 
negligence: 
The majority rule appears to be that in 
most situations, where such is the desire 
of the parties, and it is clearly under-
stood and expressed, such a covenant 
will be upheld. But the presumption is 
against any such intention, and it is not 
achieved by inference or implication from 
general language such as employed here. 
It will be regarded as a binding contrac-
tual obligation only when that intention 
is clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
408 P.2d at 914. 
The Utah Supreme Court has continued 
to cite to its language in El Paso, quoted 
above, when interpreting indemnity con-
tracts. See, e.g. Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff, 
658 P.2d 1187, (1983); Union Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Intermountain Farmer's As-
sociation, 568 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1977). 
Federal court decisions applying Utah law 
have stressed that the parties' intention 
must be "clearly and unequivocally ex-
pressed." Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 
365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.1966), Southern Pa-
cific Transportation v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 
121, 123 (10th Cir.1971). 
The question before the court, then is 
whether the indemnity provisions of the 
FAA express "clearly and unequivocally" 
the intention* to indemnify Utah Power & 
Light from losses attributable to its own 
negligence. The court's interpretation 
must be guided by the presumption against 
such intention and the understanding that 
indemnity agreements are strictly con-
strued against the indemnitee. Union Pa-
cific Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas, 17 
Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965), Shell Oil 
Co. v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d at 1189. 
[4] Jones has directed the court's atten-
tion to only three situations where courts, 
applying Utah law, have concluded that the 
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language of the contract requires an in-
demnitor to cover for losses caused by the 
indemnitee's own negligence. Those cases 
are: Shell Oil v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1983); Titan Steel Corp, v. 
Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.1966); 
Southern Pacific Transportation v. Niel-
sen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.1971). 
An examination of the indemnity provi-
sion in each of the above cases reveals that 
each provision expressly states the scope of 
the agreed upon indemnity. Each makes 
explicit reference to the indemnitor's obli-
gation to indemnify the indemnitee except 
in situations where the injury has resulted 
from the sole negligence of the indemnitee. 
Each agreement discusses the effect of the 
indemnitee's negligence.2 
The relevant language of the FAA, how-
ever, does not contain similarly explicit lan-
guage. The first sentence of paragraph 21 
provides in general language for the licen-
see to indemnify the licensor for liability 
arising out of "the erection, maintenance, 
presence, use, or removal of licensee's 
equipment " Although the cause of 
Mr. Freund's injuries comes clearly within 
the scope of this provision, the sentence 
2. The indemnity provision of the contract in 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1983) states in relevant portion: 
.. . Contractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to pro-
tect, indemnify and save Operator [Shell], its 
employees, and agents harmless from and 
against all claims, demands and causes of 
action of every kind and character arising in 
favor of Contractor's employees, Operator's 
employees or third parties on account of bodi-
ly injuries, death or damage to property aris-
ing out of or in connection with the perform-
ance of this agreement, except where such 
injury, death or damage has resulted from the 
sole negligence of Operator, without negli-
gence wilfull act on the part of the Contrac-
tor, its agents, servants, employees, or subcon-
tractors. Id. at 1189 (Emphasis added). 
The factual situation presented in Shell Oil was 
similar to the one before the court. It also 
involved a controversy over an indemnity agree-
ment between an employer covered by work-
men's compensation and a third party who was 
being sued by the employee. 
The pertinent language from the agreement at 
issue in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. 
Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir.1971) states: 
Buyer .. . agrees to indemnify and save harm-
less Railroad ... from and against . . . all 
makes no reference to the intention of the 
parties regarding whether the licensor 
would be indemnified for its own negli-
gence. Under Utah law, the language is 
not sufficiently explicit. Moreover, the sec-
ond sentence of paragraph 21, the construc-
tion of which Utah Power & Light relies on 
to interpret the first sentence, covers 
claims relating to the interruption of the 
licensor's service. It does not relate to 
personal injury claims. Its usefulness as 
an aid in construing the intention of the 
first sentence is thereby limited. 
[5] The Utah court has made it plain 
that unless the contract clearly and un-
equivocally deals with the indemnitee's 
negligence, the indemnitee will not be in-
demnified against its own negligence. This 
court reiterates the words of the Utah 
court in Union Pacific Railroad Company 
v. El Paso Natural Gas} 17 Utah 2d 255, 
408 P.2d 910 (1965) in this regard: 
If it had been the intent of the parties 
that the defendant should indemnify the 
plaintiff even against the latter's negli-
gent acts, it would have been easy 
enough to use that very language and to 
liability ... regardless of any negligence or 
alleged negligence on the part of any Railroad 
employee or agent. Id. at 124. (Emphasis 
added). 
The court in Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton, 
365 F.2d 542 (1966) decided that the intention of 
the parties was revealed through two contracts. 
The court did not distinguish between the lan-
guage of the two in its discussion. One contract 
stated: 
. . . Contractor agrees to indemnify and hold 
Owner harmless from liability for all losses, 
. . . which may arise out of, or in connection 
with, the performance of the Contract and 
which are caused by any act, or omission, of 
Contractor or subcontractors Id. at 548. 
Utah Power & Light points out that the above 
agreement does not explicitly delineate the 
scope of the indemnity obligations when the 
injury is caused by the Owner's negligence. The 
other contract however, which the Court in Ti-
tan considered in tandem with the first, does 
use more explicit language. It states: 
The subcontractor agrees to indemnify, . . . 
the Contractor and Owner against all claims 
. . . except when caused by the sole negligence 
of the Contractor or Owner. 
FREUND v. UTAH 
Cite as 625 F£upp. 
thus make that intent clear and unmis-
takable, which was not done here. Id, 
408 P.2d pp. 913-914. 
Nor is the language of the FAA suffi-
ciently clear for this court to conclude that 
the parties intended that Jones contracted 
away its workmen's compensation defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Shell Oil v. 
Brinkerhoff, 658 P.2d 1187 (1983), held 
that the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-60, did not necessarily invali-
date an agreement under which the em-
ployer agreed to indemnify a third-party 
for amounts paid to its employees. Id. at 
1191. The court's holding in Shell Oil was 
based on an analysis of a contract that 
stated expressly that the indemnitor would 
indemnify the indemnitee even for injuries 
caused to employees of the indemnitor. 
The contract in Shell Oil provided that the 
contractor would indemnify the operator 
from and against: 
. . . all claims, demands and causes of 
action of every kind and character aris-
ing in favor of Contractor's employees, 
Operators employees or third parties on 
account of bodily injuries, death or dam-
age to property arising out of or in con-
nection with the performance of this 
agreement . . . Id. at 1189 n. 1. 
Similarly, two other decisions applying 
Utah law have found the language of the 
indemnity agreement in question sufficient 
to overcome the workman's compensation 
defense because the agreement specifically 
mentioned indemnification for injury to the 
indemnitor's employees. See Titan Steel 
Corporation v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th 
Cir.1966); Oregon Shortline Railroad 
3. In Titan Steel v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th 
Cir.1966), the contract included a provision re-
quiring the contractors to indemnify: 
for any and all claims arising from injury to 
employees of Contractor, or injury to any 
subcontractor or employees of such subcon-
tractor arising from the performance of the 
Contract, and for any injury to employees of 
owner, or to third persons, or to the public, or 
to their property, caused by any act, or omis-
sion of Contractor or subcontractors .. . Id 
at 547-48. 
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Company v. Idaho Stockyards Co., 364 
P.2d 826 (Utah 1961).* 
The requirement that an agreement state 
in express terms that an employer intends 
to indemnify third-parties for employee in-
juries serves an important public policy. 
The Workmen's Compensation laws provide 
employees with expedited compensation for 
the loss of earning capacity in exchange for 
the relinquishment of their common law 
causes of action against the employer. The 
employer, in turn, gives up legal defenses 
and must pay into a compensation fund in 
return for freedom from employee suits. 
Any change in this arrangement should not 
be lightly inferred. Accordingly, an em-
ployer's intention to waive its immunity 
must be clearly expressed in the agree-
ment. 
The language of the FAA does not clear-
ly express an intention to contract away 
the employer's (Jones) workman's compen-
sation immunity. There is no reference to 
Jones' obligation to indemnify Utah Power 
& Light for injuries caused to Jones' em-
ployees. The FAA is neither clear enough 
to overcome the presumption against an 
indemnitee contracting away liability for 
his own negligence nor to overcome the 
presumption against contracting away 
one's employer immunity under Workmen's 
Compensation. 
Breach of Contract to Provide 
Liability Insurance 
Finally, Utah Power & Light contends 
that Jones must reimburse it for all losses 
it might incur because Jones breached its 
contract to provide liability insurance for 
the licensor's (UP & L) benefit. Utah Pow-
In Oregon Shortline Railroad Company v. Idaho 
Stockyard Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 ?.2d 
826 (1961), the contract provided that the con-
tractor would indemnify the railroad against all: 
. . . claims, demands, losses, costs and ex-
penses of whatsoever nature which may arise 
by reason of injury to or death of any of the 
representatives or employees of the Contrac-
tor, or by reason of damage to or loss of any 
property of the Contractor, or of his agents or 
employees, or of others when in the custody 
or control of the Contractor .. . Id 364 P.2d 
at 827. 
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er's contention is based on its interpreta-
tion of paragraph 22 of the FAA. That 
paragraph contains the following covenants 
respecting the licensee's duty to insure for 
the licensor's benefit. 
Throughout the life of this agreement, 
Licensee shall, in addition to and con-
sistent with the provisions of Paragraph 
21, maintain in full force and effect with 
the carrier or carriers selected by Licen-
see and satisfactory to the Licensor: (1) 
Compensation insurance in compliance 
with all workmen's compensation insur-
ance and safety laws of the State of 
Utah and amendments thereto; and (b) 
Bodily injury insurance with limits of 
$500,000 for each person and $1,000,000 
for each occurrence; and (c) Property 
damage liability insurance with limits of 
$250,000 for each accident and $300,000 
aggregate. 
The insurance described in (b) and (c) 
above shall also provide contractual li-
ability coverage satisfactory to Li-
censor with respect to all liabilities as-
sumed by Licensee under the provi-
sions of this agreement Policies of in-
surance obtained in compliance with the 
requirements of this paragraph 22 shall 
name Licensor as an additional insured, 
and shall be sufficient to satisfy the in-
demnification provisions of Paragraph 21 
and protect Licensor against any and 
all claims for personal injury, death, 
or property damage arising out of or 
resulting from this agreement Licen-
see shall furnish to Licensor copies of all 
policies of insurance obtained in compli-
ance with this agreement prior to the 
installation of any of Licensee's equip-
ment upon said poles and prior to the 
expiration of each policy year thereafter. 
In addition, the Licensee shall submit to 
Licensor certificates by each company 
insuring Licensee to the effect that it has 
insured Licensee under this agreement 
and that it will not cancel or change any 
policy of insurance issued to Licensee 
except after thirty (30) days notice to 
Licensor. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Power & Light argues that the 
underlined clauses indicate that the parties 
to the FAA intended that the licensee's 
obligation to insure was not limited to 
those obligations that arise under para-
graph 21's indemnity provisions. Rather, 
Utah Power & Light is to be insured 
against "any and all claims arising out of 
or resulting from this agreement" includ-
ing those not covered by the indemnity 
provisions. In other words, Utah Power & 
Light contends that the insurance provi-
sions should be construed so as to provide 
coverage for its own acts of negligence. 
[6,7] Utah law in this regard is clear. 
A requirement to provide insurance is gov-
erned by the same rule of construction as 
an indemnification provision which seeks 
indemnification for the indemnitee's own 
negligence. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp, 730 F.2d 1380 (10th 
Cir.1984). The intention of the parties re-
garding insurance coverage must be clearly 
and unequivocally expressed when the ac-
tion on the insurance agreement sounds as 
an action for indemnification. Id. at 1382, 
citing Union Pacific Railroad v. Inter-
mountain Farmers Ass'n., 568 P.2d 724, 
726 (Utah 1977). If the actual effect of the 
insurance agreement is to indemnify, then 
the rules governing indemnification must 
be applied. The court in Kennecott Cop-
per states clearly that there is no differ-
ence between an agreement to purchase 
insurance to cover the lessor's own acts 
and an indemnification agreement 730 
F.2d at 1382. In either case, the presump-
tion against insuring oneself against one's 
own acts will govern. 
[8] When those standards are applied to 
the FAA agreement, it is clear that the 
insurance provisions of paragraph 22 can 
not be construed as providing coverage be-
yond that contemplated for indemnification 
under paragraph 21. The provisions do not 
state explicitly that the insurance to be 
provided should be such as to cover the 
lessor's own negligent acts. 
In summary, this court finds that Jones, 
Konocti and Cable TV Fund VIII-B are the 
employers of Freund, Bond, and Schmitt 
within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
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pensation statutes of Utah. Under Utah 
law, Cablemain is not entitled to assert a 
common law indemnity claim against Jones. 
The Facilities Attachment Agreement, 
when examined by the exacting standards 
of Utah law, does not require Jones to 
indemnify Utah Power & Light (or any 
other potential party to the FAA) for its 
own negligence nor does it indicate a waiv-
er of Jones' workmen's compensation de-
fense. Finally, the FAA provisions govern-
ing the acquisition of insurance by Jones 
on behalf of Utah Power & Light do not 
require that Jones provide insurance for 
Utah Power & Light's own acts. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. CablemahVs motion for summary 
judgment is denied; 
2. Utah Power & Light's motion for 
summary judgment is denied; and 
3. Jones Intercable, et al's motion for 
summary judgment is granted. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
Wanda CARTER for Lakesha and 
Felicia CARTER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant 
Civ. A. No. 84-4649. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Michigan, S.D. 
Nov. 25, 1985. 
Review was sought of denial by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services of 
children's insurance benefits. The District 
Court, Julian Abele Cook, Jr., J., adopting 
report and recommendation of Steven D. 
Pepe, United States Magistrate, held that: 
(1) applicable state law under the inheri-
tance test of entitlement to children's bene-
fits was that which existed at the time 
Secretary rendered her final decision; (2) 
substantial evidence supported finding of 
administrative law judge that the children 
in the instant case had inheritance rights 
under Michigan law requiring a mutually 
acknowledged relationship of parent and 
child; and (3) inappropriate test had been 
applied in determining support under the 
other evidence of parentage test, given the 
limited employment and income of wage 
earner in the years before his death. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment granted and action remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>137 
Children born out of wedlock to wage 
earner were not entitled to children's insur-
ance benefits following his death under 
court decree test, where decree entered by 
state probate court establishing parentage 
was entered after the wage earner's death. 
Social Security Act, § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(III), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(III). 
2. Statutes <&=>219(4) 
Courts may reject an agency's inter-
pretation when its regulations do not honor 
the clear meaning of the statute, as re-
vealed by its language, purpose and histo-
ry, or when the regulations are clearly 
wrong or unreasonable. 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>137 
State inheritance laws as they existed 
at the time the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services rendered her final decision 
were to be applied in determining whether 
persons seeking children's insurance bene-
fits were to be regarded as children of 
deceased wage earner under the inheri-
tance test [Social Security Act, 
§ 216(h)(2)(A), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 416(h)(2)(A)], and thus regulation [Social 
Security Administration Regulations, 
§ 404.354, 42 U.S.C.A.App.] providing that 
state law at the time of wage earner's 
death was controlling was inconsistent with 
EXHIBIT "E" 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into this 2%_ day of #l/(p* , 
1981, by and between Karveon Sign Company, a Utah corporation 
("Seller11) , Young Electric Sign Company, a Utah corporation 
("Buyer") , and those persons whose names are set forth on the 
signature page hereof as all stockholders of the Seller, 
("Stockholders"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to acquire from Seller and Seller 
desires to convey to Buyer certain assets of the Seller as mere 
particularly described and set forth herein; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and 
covenants set forth herein and for other good and valuable 
consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, it 
is agreed as follows: 
Section 1. Assignment of Contract Rights and Disolavs. 
a. Seller hereby assigns to Buyer all rights of Seller no 
renew all sign lease agreements and sign maintenance agreements set 
forth in Schedule A hereto and all such agreements entered into 
after the date hereof but prior to closing in the normal course of 
business (it being intended that as soon as practical, Schecule A 
shall be updated to include all such additional agreements) and, 
subject to performance by 3uyer of all of its obligations under 
this Agreement, assigns and transfers to Buyer upon the expiration 
of each such sign lease agreement all right, title and interest of 
Seller free and clear of all liens or encumbrances of any kind, in 
nnrt'jQi; 
the Displays which are subject thereto (the ''Displays1') except for 
such of the Displays as are subject to transfer to the lessee by 
reason of a purchase option heretofore granted to such lessee. 
Such leases or agreements containing a purchase option to the 
lessee shall be so designated on attached Schedule B. Seller shall 
be entitled to a commission of fifteen percent of all job contracts 
pursuant to which no production has commenced prior to the date of 
closing hereunder but which job contracts have been sold in the 
ordinary course of business prior to the date of closing hereunder. 
All such job contracts are listed in Schedule "N" hereto. Seller 
shall not, directly or indirectly, interfere with or atter.pt to 
inhibit Buyer in Buyer's efforts to renew or continue business 
relationships with customers upon expiration of applicable 
agreements identified in this paragraph or other paragraphs hereof. 
b. It: is further agreed that Seller may be unable to transfer 
title to certain of the leased signs subject to third-party sign 
location leases as more particularly set forth on Schedule C 
attached hereto. 
c. It: is further agreed that those certain leases listed in 
attached Schedule D are leases which by agreement do not include 
maintenance or insurance and therefore renewal rights and/or 
residual payment for title transfer at the end thereof remain the 
property of Seller 
d. Seller will take all steps necessary to allow Buyer to 
continue Seller's obligations under the lease and maintenance 
agreements including, where necessary, obtaining the consent cf the 
-2-
user of the Display. All leases and ether items of property 
excluded from purchase and retained by Seller are listed on 
Schedule D and Schedule E, or in the event not listed on another 
Schedule attached hereto are excluded from the terms hereof. 
Section 2. Assumption of Certain Contractual Obligations. 
a. Buyer agrees to satisfy, perform and discharge when cue 
all obligations of Seller (excluding f,sales taxes1' if any, imposed 
in respect to the remaining term of sign lease agreements) 
hereinafter arising under said sign lease agreements and sign 
maintenance agreements until their respective expiration dates, 
including but not limited to service, maintenance and replacement 
of parts, and Buyer further agrees to pay when cue all personal 
property taxes assessed against said Displays in respect of all 
periods ending subsequent to the effective date hereof and to 
'provide, at its expense, insurance coverage adequate to full>i 
protect Seller against property damage (including damage to 
Displays and integral parts) or personal injury or death claims 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, service, 
transportations, or installation of Displays' in a minimum amount of 
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). buch insurance shall include 
insurance against damage to said displays 
b. Buyer assumes no liabilities or obligations of Seller 
except as specifically described and set forth herein. 
c. Buyer shall have the right to file and Seller agrees to 
sign reasonable forms of financing statements or security 
agreements to secure Buyer's' interests in the underlying signs. 
-3- 000337 
Section 3. Inventory. 
a. Seller hereby further agrees to sell and assign to Buyer, 
and Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller, all right, title, and 
interest of Seller in all inventories of materials, parts and 
components not included in work in process, owned by Seller as of 
the date hereof. Said inventories shall be as set forth on 
Schedule F attached hereto and the total purchase price shall be as 
set forth on Schedule F. Terms of the purchase price payment shall 
be as outlined in Section 13 hereof. The original inventory list 
shall be as of July 31, 1981, and shall be updated at closing. 
b. All items listed in the Schedule of inventories of 
materials, parts, and components shall be in new or usable 
condition as of the closing date and must be approved by Buyer at 
closing. 
Section 4. Equipment. 
a. Seller hereby agrees to sell and Buyer hereby agrees to 
purchase those certain items of property, and equipment, including 
rolling stock as listed on Schedule G, attached hereto. Payment of 
the purchase price shall not include the assumption of any 
liabilities, but shall include those other terms and conditions as 
set forth in Section 13, hereof. The price shall be based on the 
higher of fair market value or book value for each such item. 
b. All such items of property, and equipment, including 
rolling stock shall be in good working condition and in a 
reasonably good state of repair as of the closing date. 
Section 5. Work in Process. 
-4- nom~ 
a Seller shall furnish Buyer, pi: lor to closing, a complete 
1 i '«1 MI I i« ill i i i ]j i; o L v,. s ai d Bi i> e i s I i a 1 ] f i n i s I i s u c 1 I "w o i: k i n p r o c e s s 
for its own account as soon as practicable after the effective date 
hereof. Buyer s h a I  II p a;; > S e 1 1 e r 1 i i c a s i I a :: 3 inin i s s I o n o f i i i n e 
p erc en t (91) o f tl I e c on tr a c t p r i c e o f 11 I e * c :: k i n process. Buyer 
further agrees ""-~ - ^  -~ - + - ~- -'- % •- - --.**- : ~-u 
_ . _ ;.,; - c 
equal : actus, materia, cos' ^ !a :r, V; en „™pletior ^r 
such work m process and instc ' ~-~ - -
lease agreement and property : ,.a::\ : c::e:o sha-1 e leemed 
$~~e asset of ? •* -r C - -- process „ listed ^> contract and 
Schedule -i. 
Seller shall ^ t . t l e i :."iss:cn •: f fifteen 
percent ui o -.._,._-..•. .._ , 
commenced pr... *: . L:. . -reunder I t 
er'ira.-j • -^ * • 1 * ordinarv * - e - f business prior 
t: o 1:1: I 2 d a t e ::> £ c 1 o s i 1 1 g 1: 1 e r e u 1 1 G e r ., A 3 1! s i : c: 1 j o c: • c 0 n t r a c t s are 
listed in Schedule "N" hereto. 
Section 6 Sign Face Molds 
Seller shall furnish to Buyer all sigi 1 face molds which are 
available v.-: which were used in the production cf the Displays 
1
 ib j e c t :: f 11 11 s 1 Lgr e en 1 en t. 
Section 7. Failure of Title. 
In the event that Seller is unable to pass title to Buyer to 
any Display as contemplated by this Agreement at the termination of 
the sign lease agreement applicable thereto, exclusive cf Displays 
which are the subject of purchase options (for which provisions is 
made in Section 1 of this Agreement), then Seller shall reimburse 
Buyer for all maintenance theretofore performed by Buyer with 
respect to such Display based on costs shown on Buyer's monthly 
contract status report, and including personal property taxes and 
sign floater insurance paid, if any, subject, however, to audit by 
Seller. Buyer's costs shall include labor, materials, and 27% 
added thereto as overhead. 
Section 8. Seller's Real Estate Lease. 
a. Buyer hereby agrees to assume, as of the date of closing, 
that certain real estate lease dated Kay 1, 1973, by and between 
Seller and David F. and Bessie B. Sawyer. 3uyer agrees to 
faithfully perform and -discharge the terms and conditions of said 
lease. Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a sublease on terms 
and conditions of said Sawyer lease. 
b. Buyer and Seller shall also enter into a lease en terms 
and conditions similar to the terms of the Sawyer lease with regard 
to additional land and improvements at the Marveon shop: The 
rental for which shall be $500 per month. 
c. The Sawyer lease, assignment and consent of Lessors, and 
the other lease are attached hereto as Schedule I, J, and K. The 
consent to assignment by Seller to Buyer shall provide for the 
ability of Buyer to sublease the Sawyer premises to a third party 
without the consent of the Sawyers. 
Section 9. Contract Rewrites. 
iwcc.2 Schedu. r . - f s h a l l •-.> ; : . ; : > r - t c ~ l : - : r 
c . — agreement Buyer may n e g o t i ? * ° -^  ~ - ' * * . I ; L O a r.ev arreer^nr 
_ e a p^rt ^uvpr 
shajl pay - leller - balanc - cvir,* '-' > r t:.e existing sign lease 
lessee .. alterr.ar . /e , Buyer ::,..} c-'.^l. w . separate 
agreement: wi th the lessee relating •- hanges i i 1 the existing 
a g i e e m e i 11 s :: • 1 • ::> i 1 g a s 11 i e o i: I g I i I a 1 . a g r e e in e n t, a s b e t w e e n 
Sell er and such lessee, shall continue to be in effect and fully 
perf orme J "' :r si ich 1 essee 
Section ..G. Emnlovees. 
a. Buyer shal"1 v v r ~~ -<^-~ - c-cy -.-
( . L - . . . . . . . . tl ie 
date t:eA'
 # employed by Sell-r connection with Seller'? sign 
bi is: ness 
b. Buyer agrees to offer employment to Douglas Brcvn, R.ay 
Draper, zr i Dennis Remy at not less th a i I the: r current salaries and 
] , ing per iocs foi 3u> erVs employment 
benefits, to the extent legally possible to allow ten years 
seniority in v P 1 at I nil to sahl benef ^  r s . • 
c Buyer agrees to retain Seller as a consultant with regard 
t: u'iness assumed hereunder =:>' * iy Seller an annual 
( tl: .] i: t .: ie first 
t ^  '.*.-month periods after .losing -c '::(C00 annually during each 
of Lue subse" .ent *" " -2-mc::th oerrocs. Seller mav a" rontirue 
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to represent Buyer in sales promotion activities, and shall be 
entitled to standard commissions and approved expenses for any and 
all contracts negotiated by Seller on behalf of Buyer which such 
contracts are acceptable to Buyer. 
d. Buyer agrees to provide Seller with a copy of its annual 
audited financial statements until all terms hereof have been 
performed. 
Section 11. Eminent Domain. 
In the event that Buyer is required to remove or alter any of 
the Displays by reason of eminent domain or condemnation 
proceedings under circumstances whereunder the effect of such 
removal or alteration.would render the effected Display unavailable 
for transfer to Buyer at the expiration of the applicable sign 
lease agreement in substantially the condition or location now 
existing, then, in such event, Seller shall be responsible for the 
cost of removal or alteration of such Display and shall be entitled 
to receive any condemnation award in connection with the required 
removal or alteration. Section 9 hereof shall then apply to 
reimbursement of Buyer's costs to date of such removal. 
Section 12. Billing of Seller's Customers. 
Seller shall establish a system and. be responsible for billing 
on all accounts for the benefit of Seller with respect to those 
accounts wherein Buyer has assumed maintenance responsibilities 
under Section One hereof. Buyer shall have the right to examine 
the billing records at any reasonable time. 
Section 13. Pavment of Purchase Price. 
-
-8- r\nr\r>*n> 
The f i n a l p u r c h a s e price? s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d 
foT 11 i i 11 i' • i» M " > » M I i SL lie i J i, ! i <ip[. roved 
hereto. 
^ipment 
Equipment 
- Process - Under Production 
^- r q_- 3 Sold - No ProducLic * - •-1 
operty 
Total $ 
b. The final purchase price vr."l :e paid w:*h 3 ^ cash 
down payment September* i;oi, * " a 
pi; t)iiiiisbL i _ M i ' in ,,» ^ u u attached we-^uw ab Schedule M. i/.e 
terms cf th ? n.f. e r^ , M bvi basically as follows: 
T w ^ r * uf
 tM' i ! nc^i1*! ii;sf"i - erif:s \itn annual interest 
calculated at the First interstate prime rate en the cay of 
closin?, adjustod quarcerlv thrrf ^-, r N - : - r, i n * T?.i
 (i i 1, 
I 9 S i , I i! 11• t 1 c so Liian i '.)Vo per' an11urn, 
Section 14. Conveyances. 
The SV'llpr hPTi'v nr^pvr rh.it .r llif "'K siij^ licii. andfr , ; t 
will deliver to Buyer such bills of sale with covenants of general 
warranty, endorsements, assignments, and other eor.d ;--i! sufficient 
iiio LI LIM-MIL • ul transfer, assignment, and conveyance. In form 
satisfactory t>« Buyer and its counsel, as shall be effective to 
- n the 
oarties 
vest in Buyer good and marketable title to all of the properties 
and assets of the Seller being purchased hereunder, except as to 
those liens and encumbrances as listed on Schedule L hereto. 
Section 15. Delinquent Accounts. 
Seller shall notify Buyer of any sign lease agreement or sign 
maintenance agreement that becomes more than 60 days delinquent in 
payment, and, Buyer's obligation to any sign lease agreement more 
than 60 days delinquent shall be suspended upon notice from Seller 
until the account has been paid current or arrangements 
satisfactory to Seller have been made for payment of the account. 
In the event any of the Displays are repossessed by Seller cue to 
the lessee's default, title thereto shall be transferred to Buyer 
only when (i) Buyer has paid all costs of repossession, in which 
event Buyer shall be responsible for all further expenses in 
connection with said Display, or (ii) at the conclusion of probable 
or existing litigation involving said Display in which event Buyer 
shall hold and protect said Display in storage for Seller until any 
such litigation has been concluded, not to exceed 1 year after the 
expiration of the Underlying Customer Agreement. Seller shall 
reimburse Buyer for any required reinstallation expense. 
Section 16. Free Access to Plants, Properties, and Records. 
The Seller shall give to Buyer and to its counsel, accountants 
and other representatives, and to independent auditors selected by 
it, free and full access, during normal business hours, throughout 
the period from the date hereof to the Closing, to all of the 
Seller's properties, books, contracts, leases, commitments, and 
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records,' and the Seller shall furnish Buyer during this period with 
all financia r -.T--:*— : - ^  — nformat: ^  - the 
bii ] s i nes ;s, i^ie 
to time ma a a s o n a b l y request : r - . u . l e r 
Section 1: T^l:Si " .-£il " -' fc~ - r 1 — ^........ :^ --. :* 
Unle~ * - **: : len . n: -n: i departure :": r any 
of the following shall have been obtained, ^ ^ *• - *"~- "l^s:n? 
• a. T 6 
prudent marine ' , ; . ordinal ;:ur„t c: rus;: ss; 
1 nu wt^ r. *~~~' LuatidCL amencmei. *-,-.'-- - -
 t 
Qi'j- ci. i~~.~i t m ^ ^ ^ c , 3 entered in**^ ^Tr _ oehalr , ~ *- er 
with respect properties and a?--t5 * - " ._.-•_-_.; > ;- .er 
hi:ri::unnie r , unless I !. '..„'» »•-• • i i: t:. r i • d luLu- J i llv. i,-i:dinary courts oi the 
Seller's business and does no t: cons t i tut e a br each of" any c t* t he 
representations and warranties set fcrrh in rirr," ,c>r f ion h e r ^ f 
c. The Seller and the Stockholders will use their best 
efforts to preserve for Buyer the good will of all the firms and 
per ? en r h •H1 '' P r! ^i|1,,J *_r, t; i; '.v 1 1 ? I a > LI, E'Ib w j, i; !;i. ", »-1, !. H! , L_.no 
d, "The Seller will duly comply with all laws applicable to i ;; 
and to the conduct of its business. 
Section 18. Actions bv the Seller and the Stockholders on a^d 
- — 
after the Closing. 
a Th e S e 1 1 e r a: : d 11 i e S t c: • c k h o 1 d e i: s " ? i 1 1 c o o p e i a t e , = ,/i I d 1|; ; : 1 1 
use a 11 reasonable efforts t:o have the of f icers , cirectors
 f and 
other employees of the Company cooperate, with Buyer at i ts 
.11-
< * 
request, on and after the Closing Date, in endeavoring to conduct 
its business. 
b. The Seller and the Stockholders agree to use all 
reasonable efforts to persuade those employees of the Seller that 
Buyer may designate to become employees of Buyer after the Closing 
Date. 
c. Except as provided in Section 10.c. above, Seller agrees 
to refer all calls received by Seller for new work including sales 
leads, maintenance, installation, etc. to Buyer. Seller shall 
coordinate all such sales activities under Section 10.c. with the 
appropriate representative of Buyer. 
Section 19. The Closing. 
The purchase of assets described in this Agreement shall be 
consummated at Closing to be held at the offices of counsel for 
Buyer in Salt Lake City, Utah, at 4:00 P.M., local time, on the 2nd 
day of September, 1981, or at such other place, time, and date as 
the parties hereto shall mutually agree upon. The date and event 
of such purchase of assets are, respectively, herein referred to as 
the ,fClosing Date11 and the "Closing." 
Section 19. Representations, Warranties, and Covenants of the 
Seller. 
The Seller and the Stockholders, severally, hereby represent, 
warrant, and covenant to Buyer as follows: 
a. The Seller is a corporation duly organized and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Seller has the 
power to own its properties and assets and to carry on its business 
-12- GoorwsG 
a s i t: i s i :tc • v.; 1: eing conducted , and is du3 y qi ;a 1 if ied to do business 
and is in good standing in every jurisdiction in which the nature 
o £ i t s bi i s i n e s s ma k e s q;i ia ] I f i c a t i o n i :i e c e s s air: y . 
b T l le Seller "has, and on the Closing Date will have, good 
and "marketable ti tl e to al ] assets described in Schedules hereof as 
beii ig o"« i :ied lb> i t * 1 1 s i i ::::h assets are subj ect to no H *> n c 
mortgages, pledge^ . ancumbrances, or charges of any kl nd except 
those desr r i 1M-H| hi- h\ I i I1,, 
c Except as provided in Schedule L, the Seller is net a 
party to any contract adversely affecting assets being purchased or 
c m , L I i i. L i I. t. ,. [J ipJ i i-j b u i i i u u . 
From the date hereof to <-nd including the Closing Date, the 
Seller w* 1 "I i t i M 11 r J: I H ..U . U U I CJJII/IM. : m / . u n ' i vM ' \ "vt 
the prior written consent of Buyer. The Heeler has performed MI 
all material respects all obligations required to be performed by 
i i ' i Lduii nereci a:;c is riut: in ietauli , n any material respect 
under any agreements, leases, m: other documents to which it is a 
par t y EII i I it: ::  \ ; I I : c 1 :i Bi :y e r :i s s i i c c e e • i I i i g ::) i = s s urn: i : g c • I: 1 i g a t: i c n s 
hereunder. 
d There are no actions, suits, or: proceedings pending or 
thr o,it i»:iud "i;; a 111 •„, !„ i, ,j, t; 1 e c t,: i' «i, Lin.1 S e l l e r at IcU' M I u q u i t y o r 
admiralty, or before or by ::ny federal, state, m u n i c i p a l , i i other 
g o v e m m e n t a 1 deTr"'<arrriKM,, r p i nmm"i ss i n11 ( I i,• i' , 1 1 p r * j M « n i i r 
instrumentality, domestic or foreign, d'MM involve a n ; ilaira 
against: the assets being purchased or contracts being assumed, 
ui : 1 e s s L i s c I ."':.) v1 j h e r e in . 
e. In all material respects, the Seller has performed and 
abided by all the obligations required to be performed by it to the 
date hereof with respect to contracts assumed by Buyer, and will 
continue to abide by and perform them up to and including the 
Closing Date, and the Seller is not in default and to the extent 
that it will be materially affected adversely under a license, 
permit, order, authorization, grant, agreement, lease, or other 
document, order, or regulation to which it is a party or by.which 
it is bound, affecting such contracts. 
f. The Seller has complied in all material respects with all 
applicable statutes and regulations of any governmental authority 
having jurisdiction over it or applicable to its business. 
g. In the conduct of its business during the preceding three 
years and as now operated, the Seller has not infringed any United 
States or foreign patents of others. The Seller owns or possesses 
adequate license or other rights to use all trademarks, trace 
names, and copyrights that are employed in the conduct: of its 
business and has not received any notice of conflict with any 
asserted rights of others that remain in effect. 
h. By appropriate vote of its Board of Directors and by 
either the unanimous written consent of its stockholders or their 
unanimous vote at a meeting duly called, convened, and held, all in 
accordance with law and its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, 
the Seller has full power to execute and perform this Agreement and 
to transfer its properties and assets as herein provided, and such 
execution and performance does not conflict with any provisions of 
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its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws rr with any contract to 
which if i i i nl > i i I i ,'l i i In i f i i il H I t .• 
i. None at; tin1 Seller* s properties and assets to be 
transferred to Buyer pursuant to thi s Agreement is subject to any 
i"e s t, 11 c L i oi i :: i: 1 i mI ta11 oi i pi o 1: Iib i t ing , r e s tr ic ting, or r equir ing 
any consent to such transfer unless specifically denoted hex ein. 
j iifl 11ached hei: e to a s S ::::he :ii I 1 e N ai I• I 1 iereby iriad 2 a p ar t 
hereof is a detailed schedule of all of the Seller * s jo bs tl : at, as 
of *"he date hereof, had been sold i n the ordinary course of 
b ess :::>f 11 Ie Se"1 1 ei: and upon which procuction had not cozzzenced 
showing, with respect to each such job, the job number, the name of 
the pur c haser , (1 e s see) , and 11 i e tota 1 cont ra c t pr i c e 
k Eac 1 I of the representations and warranties set forth in 
this Section shall bo N'uo at and as of the time of Closing w: tin, 
ti.e . due L i c. aii J eiiect au though ir.aati at and a c c: - . c , i 
Closing. 
Section 21 „ Repr e sen t a t ions , 1\ arr an t ie s JLT \d Ccvenan t s cf B u> er . 
Suyer hereby represents, w a r r a n t s , and covenants tc the Seller 
and _ v Stockholders is follows: 
r ........ . y o r g an i z e d , v a 1 i d 1 y existing, 
and - z : ? . " standing under the laws of the State of Utah, and is 
du 1 y qu a 1 i f i e u f o i e i gn c o r p :: i : a t: I • :: • i i i i c ] 1 
j u r i . n o t i o n s wh^r- ^M. ., i s i n e s s . 
Purchaser has f u l l power, i i i accordance with law, to 
exe ^ g r e e m e n t (i ! <;11rh execut ion ar id 
performance does net conflict, with any ^rcv-isicns of its Articles 
of Incorporation or bylaws, as amended to the date hereof, or with 
any contract to which it is a party or to which it is subject. The 
Board of Directors of Buyer has authorized, or before the Closing 
will have authorized, this Agreement, the transactions contemplated 
herein, and the execution and delivery hereof. 
c. Each of the representations and warranties set forth in 
this Section shall be true at and as of the time of Closing with 
the same force and effect as though made at and as of the time of 
Closing, and shall survive the Closing. 
Section 22. Conditions Precedent to the Buyer's Obligations. 
All obligations of Buyer to be discharged under this Agreement 
at the Closing are subject to fulfillment prior to or at the 
Closing of each of the following conditions, unless expressly 
waived in writing by Buyer at any time prior to the Closing: 
a. Buyer shall not have discovered any material error, 
misstatement, or omission in their representations, warranties, and 
covenants made by the Seller and the Stockholders herein. 
b. The representations, warranties and covenants of the 
Seller and the Stockholders set forth herein shall be deemed to 
* 
have been made again at and as of the time of Closing and then 
shall be true in all material respects, except as modified as of 
the time of Closing to the extent necessary to reflect intervening 
transactions expressly permitted hereunder; the Seller and the 
Stockholder shall have performed and complied with all the terms, 
covenants, and conditions required by this Agreement to be 
performed by them prior to or at the Closing. 
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c. The Bulk Sales Law of the State of Utah has been complied 
with HI]" is inapplicable Lu ill i., t r . i n M r f i m and i:h«1ln i I Hereby 
Indemnities Bu>er with regard lo any elaiiis thereunder. 
' d. The schedules attached hereto shall indicate all leaces, 
s ig11"," i:, "(u i pi:ie111 i! J ' t'l 111! o t , ! 11j i assets pI ed£,ed t b ecure anv 
debt of Seller, Buyei' shall have nhe vighr. t o r e v i e w all loan 
documents and pledge agreement s rel at i n j', t o such asset-""• ai i :i d E •!: t 
ar "! shall Lie enf„ i, t led to satisfy itself, prior r i closing, as to 
the ability of Seller to pay off such debt so as to enable Seller 
II" | i I " "", I i I I I" ,1,1 ,i I" l ,ii ".„, "; (:! I", ', 1 ["ill, I " > I i | 
Section 23. Conditions Precedent to the Obligations of the Seller 
and the Stockholders 
AI 1 obligations of the Seller and the Stockholders to be 
discharged under this Agreement are sub j ect to the f ul f illment, 
p r i I'»ii • i i , 11 i ' i 11 n e c: f C1 o s i n g , :: f • a a :: 1: 1 ::> f 1 1 1 e f 011 owing 
conditions, unless waived in writing by the Seller a nd t: .e 
Stockholders at any time prior to tl le CI o s i n g : 
a , Buyer's representations and warranties set forth herein 
shall ^ deemed to have been made again at ard a r of rhp n ^ e cf 
t 'fi);!, .iir, I i" !ii:' I i i MI»! in .ii ' I U U L U i• i I i n s p e c t s D u v e r 
shall have performed and complied with all! c o v e n a n t s , a g r e e m e n t s , 
and e d i t i o n s required by thin Agreement to he parforrrd r,n M 
p r . : • ::> • :: 1: : t t h e time 0 f C losing. 
Section 24. Nature and Survival of Representations, Warranties, 
Covenants, and Agreements. 
Buyer, the Seller, and the Stockholders agree that: 
1. Their respective representations and warranties set forth 
in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and thereafter shall be 
fully effective and enforceable, and shall not be affected by any 
investigation, verification, or approval by any party hereto or by 
anyone on behalf of any such party; 
2. Their respective covenants and agreements set forth in 
this Agreement, except those covenants and agreements that are 
required, expressly by this Agreement to be fully kept, performed, 
and discharged on or before the Closing, shall survive the Closing 
and thereafter shall be fully effective and enforceable; 
3. After the Closing and prior to any dissolution of the 
Seller, the representations and warranties and the surviving 
covenants and agreements herein made by the Seller shall be binding 
upon, performed by, and enforceable against the Seller, except that 
all the costs of such performance shall be borne and paid by the 
Stockholders; 
4. In the event of dissolution of the Seller, all 
representations and warranties herein made by either the Seller, 
the Stockholders, or both and the surviving covenants and 
agreements herein made by either the Seller, the Stockholders, or 
both, shall be deemed to be assumed by the Stockholders; 
5. No liability of the Seller for or by reason of breach of 
any of its said representations, warranties, covenants, and 
agreements shall be deemed to be a liability of the Seller assumed 
by Buyer hereunder, but, on the contrary, shall remain the 
-18- 000352 
liability of the Seller, the Stockholders, or both, as provided 
herein. 
Section 25. Etn^lovment and Noncompetition. 
a. Buyer shall not have any obligations with respect to 
hiring or any other matters as to present or past employees of the 
Seller. 
b. The Seller and all Stockholders of the Seller shall enter 
into a noncompetition agreement in the form attached hereto as 
Schedule 0. 
Section 26. Miscellaneous. 
a. The Seller, or, after its dissolution, its surviving 
directors, trustees, or receiver, and the Stockholders, at any tire 
and from time to time after the Closing Date, upon the request of 
Buyer and without further consideration, will do, execute, 
acknowledge, and deliver all such further actions, deeds, bills of 
sale, assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney, and 
assurances, and will take such other action, as reasonably may be 
required by Buyer, to assign, convey, transfer, and deliver to, and 
vest in, Buyer and put it in possession of, and protect its right 
and title to, interest in, and enjoyment of, the properties and 
assets of the Seller intended to be assigned, conveyed, 
transferred, and delivered pursuant to this Agreement. 
b. Subject to the terms, provisions, and conditions hereof, 
this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit 
of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, and assigns. 
c. Any notice, request, instruction, or other document to be 
given hereunder to any party shall be in writing, delivered 
personally or sent by registered mail or certified United States 
Air Mail, postage prepaid, or telegram as follows: 
Addresses of the Parties: 
Young Electric Sign Company 
c/o Thomas Young, Jr. President 
P.O. Box 25728 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125 
Marveon Sign Company 
c/o Glen Jerry Brown 
4875 Knollwood Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Any party may change his or its address for purposes of this 
paragraph by giving notice of change of address to the other 
parties in the manner herein provided for giving notice. 
d. This instrument contains the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated hereby 
and shall not be changed or terminated except by a written 
instrument signed by the parties hereto. 
e. All exhibits and Schedules attached hereto are 
incorporated herein. 
f. This Agreement is declared to have been made under the-
laws of the State of Utah. 
g. The section and other headings contained in this Agreement 
are for reference purposes only and shall not in any way affect the 
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
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h. This Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts, and all of these counterparts together shall 
constitute one and the same Agreement. 
i. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision hereof 
shall not affect nor impair any other provision hereof. 
j. The failure of any party to enforce the provisions of this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver unless specifically stated 
in writing, signed-by the party whose rights are deemed waived, 
regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder. 
k. In the event of default, the defaulting party shall be 
liable for all reasonable costs of enforcement including attorney's 
fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this 
Agreement to be duly executed as of the day and year first above 
written. 
MARVEON ^GjWCOKPANY ^ ^ — s YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN CCXPANY 
IEON STOCKHOLDERS: 
By: ^ / A^^^f^^ ^ /y" 
MarvaTS. Brown, StocK.no3.der 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MARVEON SIGN COMPANY 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOSHIKO PICKHOVER, an individual 
and personal representative of 
the Estate of John W. Pickhover; 
CATHERINE PICKHOVER, an indivi-
dual; and GLORIA PICKHOVER, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation; SMITH'S FOOD 
KING PROPERTIES, a Utah corpora-
tion, DEE'S, INC., a Utah cor-
poration; YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
MARVEON SIGN COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and IMAGE NATIONAL, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER 
Defendant Marveon Sign Company answers plaintiff's com-
plaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted as to this defendant. 
ANSWER AND CROSSCLAIM 
Civil No. C85-4307 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The negligence of this defendant/ if any# and any is 
expressly denied, was not the legal cause, the proximate cause 
or the cause in fact of the death of John W. Pickhover, the 
injuries of Toshiko Pickhover or the damages of which plaintiffs 
complain, 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The death of John W. Pickhover was caused or proximately 
contributed to by the negligence of John W. Pickhover, and 
plaintiffs1 damages are either barred or reduced accordingly, 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The damages of which plaintiffs complain were proximately 
caused by the negligence or other actionable conduct of others 
who this defendant did not and could not control. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The injuries of Toshiko Pickhover were caused or proxi-
mately contributed to by the negligence of Toshiko Pickhover, 
and her damages are either barred or reduced accordingly. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs1 complaint is barred because plaintiffs 
assumed the risk. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
This defendant responds to the number of paragraphs of 
the Complaint as follows: 
1. Admits 
2 through 7. This defendant is without information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 
the allegations of paragraphs 2 through 7, 
and therefore denies the same. 
8. Admits. 
9 through 14. This defendant is without information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of 
the allegations of paragraphs 9 through 14, 
and therefore denies the same. 
15. This defendant admits that it built a sign in 
1978 and installed it at Smith's Food King at 
2039 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah in 1978 and 
maintained that sign until 1981, and this 
defendant denies each and every other allegation 
of paragraph 15. 
16. This defendant is without information sufficient 
to form a belief as to the truth of the allega-
tions of paragraph 16, and therefore denies 
the same. 
17 through 84, the first through seventh claims for 
relief. This defendant denies each and every 
other allegation of paragraphs 17 through 84, 
the first through seventh claims for relief to 
the extent that they may be reasonably construed 
to be directed towards this defendant. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
This defendant denies each and every other allegation of 
plaintiffs' complaint not specifically herein admitted. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
This defendant did not owe plaintiffs any duty. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Under Utah law there is no such tort as negligent in-
fliction of emotional stress. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
As an affirmative defense, this defendant alleges that 
since 1981 it did not maintain the sign, it had no power or 
ability to control the sign or the premises where the sign 
was located, and further, this defendant alleges that in 1984 
some three years after this defendant last performed any main-
tenance on the sign, the premises where the sign was located 
were extensively remodeled. 
CROSSCLAIM 
This defendant crossclaims against Smith's Management 
Corporation, Smith's Food King Properties, Dee's Inc., Young 
Electric Sign Company, and Image National, Inc. as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' filed a complaint which alleges, gen-
erally, that plaintiffs' decedent was killed on the premises 
at Smith's Food King at 2039 East 9400 South, Sandy, Utah, 
and that plaintiff Toshiko Pickhover was injured at the same 
time and place as a result of a falling sign striking their 
bodies. 
2. Although this defendant built the sign and installed 
the same in 1978 and maintained it until 1981, this defendant 
had no ability or power to control the premises or maintain the 
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sign since 1981. 
3. In 1981, this defendant sold its maintenance contract 
with Smith's Food King to defendant Young Electric. Young 
Electric maintained the sign until that maintenance contract 
expired in 1984. 
4. Smith's Food King then entered into a maintenance 
contract with either Young Electric or defendant Image/ or both. 
5. In 1984 the premises where the sign was located were 
extensively remodeled, which substantially altered the entire 
physical plant as it related to the defendant's prior acts 
covering the sign. 
6. The negligence or other actionable conduct of this 
defendant, and any is expressly denied, was secondary and passive 
to the active and primary negligence or other actionable fault 
of cross-defendants. 
7. In the event a judgment is returned in favor of plain-
tiffs and against this defendant, this defendant is entitled to 
be fully indemnified by cross-defendants. In the alternative, 
this defendant is entitled to contribution from cross-defendants 
in the full amount of any such judgment or to the full extent 
authorized by the Utah Contribution Statute. 
WHEREFORE, having answered plaintiffs' complaint, this 
defendant prays that the same be dismissed, and that it be 
awarded it's costs incurred herein including reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs and such other relief as the court deemed just 
and appropriate. In the event that a judgment is entered in 
favor of plaintiff and against this defendant, this defendant 
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prays for indemnification and/or contribution from cross-
defendants for the full amount of any such judgment entered 
in favor of plaintiff, and for such other relief as the court 
deems just and appropriate in the circumstances, including 
costs and fees incurred herein and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
DATED this ZA day of August, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rob^ft H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Marveon Sign 
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